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STANLEY
FOUNDATION:
NEW POWER DYNAMICS IN SOUTHEAST
ASIA - CHANGING SECURITY COOPERATION AND COMPETITION: 21/04/2008
(MaximsNews Network)
|
UNITED
NATIONS - / MaximsNews Network / 21
April 2008 -- Fair or
not, the longstanding perception that Southeast Asia remains on the back
burner of the United States’ strategic agenda endures.
Since
the end of the Second World War, with the exception of the Vietnam War,
Southeast Asia has played second fiddle to Northeast Asia.
Driven
primarily by post-September 11, 2001, concerns—and consistent with its
preference for a hub-and-spokes approach—the United States has engaged with
Southeast Asian countries according to individual security concerns rather
than through multilateral frameworks such as the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), or the East Asia Summit
(EAS).
While
this arrangement has served the practical interests of both sides well and
will probably continue in the immediate term, there is at the same time a
growing need to reconsider the role of regional institutions as new power
dynamics and evolving concepts of security take shape in the region.
These
trends include:
1.
The proliferation of multilateral security arrangements in the region.
These
may be military-based (such as the treaty-based and non-treaty-based strategic
alliances led by the United States) or soft-power mechanisms (such as the ARF
and the six-party talks in Northeast Asia).
Paradoxically,
there may be a risk of creating greater instability through these
arrangements, especially if they are viewed as competitive rather than
complementary.
The
risk increases where strategic alliances are perceived to target a regional
power, usually China.
2.
A growing confidence among Southeast Asian states to manage regional security
affairs on their own through ASEAN, or at least to have greater input into the
wider security architecture of the ARF.
The
signing of the ASEAN Charter and the Declaration of the Bali Concord II—committing
member states to the establishment of an ASEAN Community founded on the three
pillars of economics, security, and sociocultural development—is symbolic of
the comfort level among member states, their political and economic variances
notwithstanding.
Issues
like Burma may remain problematic for ASEAN, but the latter’s move toward
greater integration marks the passing of old interstate suspicions into the
age of shared transnational threats such as terrorism, pandemics, and natural
disasters.
3.
The uncertainty of Southeast Asia’s role in a wider regional architecture
encompassing Northeast Asia.
One
of the obvious differences between Southeast and Northeast Asia is that there
is no equivalent to ASEAN in the latter.
A
comparable Northeast Asian security arrangement arising from the six-party
talks would probably be desirable for the region’s overall stability, but
closer cooperation of the region’s major powers may sideline ASEAN as a “neutral
platform” for any future regional security architecture.
This
would also have implications for the United States’ hub-and-spokes alliance
system, particularly if positive trends in relations between China and Japan
continue to develop.
The
growing economic interdependence of regional powers—notably, China, India,
Japan, and the Republic of Korea—and its implications upon their relations.
Whether economic linkages and stability alone can guarantee security among
these powers gets into the debate of balancing interests against values.
The
latter has been trumpeted as the cornerstone of US-Japan and US-India
relations while the former seems to underpin the changing security matrix in
the region.
Although
Northeast Asia has yet to resolve its historical differences, economic
relations among China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea have been deepening.
The notion of comprehensive security— long fashionable in variant forms in
China, Japan, and Malaysia—appears to be back in vogue.
It
also offers a powerful mechanism for regional security by fusing the concepts
of economic and technological development with political security.
5.
The changing perspective of Asia as competing markets rather than competing
nation-states.
Washington’s
geopolitical view of Asia is increasingly becoming a minority one.
With
the United States no longer having a monopoly on large financial investments,
there is growing nervousness on “Wall Street” about American
competitiveness in the face of a rising Asia.
The
issue is no longer one of how to deal with Communist governments in the
region, but rather how to withstand and compete against the burgeoning Chinese
and Indian economies as well as stock markets in Hong Kong and Shanghai.
Terrorism
Southeast
Asia has had a long history of dealing with terrorism, but the attacks of
September 11, 2001, on US soil were both a boon and a bane for the region.
One of
the consequences of the United States’ immediate focus on Southeast Asia as
the “second front” in the war on terror was to direct funding, intelligence,
and training to Indonesia and the Philippines.
In
Indonesia, US antiterror assistance has reaped tangible rewards in the form of
arrests, prosecutions, and convictions.
Further
terror acts have also been averted since 2002.
In the
Philippines, September 11, 2001, added a religious dimension to what had always
been a primarily developmental problem—that of socioeconomic inequality
between Muslim Mindanao and “colonial Manila.”
The
regional consensus is that terrorism, in a domestic context, is a community
issue best resolved by the police.
There
is, in this regard, a continued role for the United States in helping to build
the capacities, capabilities, and resources of the police in the region rather
than providing Special Forces or drones, or increasing defense
cooperation.
Where
there is a military presence because of traditional alliances, this has been
especially well-received by local communities, not because of their combat roles
but for their assistance in building infrastructures and improving the capacity
of local governments there.
The US
Navy could replicate these efforts on- and offshore in the context of maritime
security in Southeast Asia.
Goodwill
operations run by the Pacific Command, such as dedicating ships for medical
purposes where they are both needed and wanted, should be encouraged and
supported for its counterterrorism, local livelihood improvement, and
image-boosting aspects.
US
public diplomacy efforts would be optimized by a sound and nuanced understanding
of the domestic situation in Southeast Asian countries.
Today
fewer Southeast Asians are pursuing their studies in the United States, and many
who work there often stay and never return to their home countries.
This
means that the United States is losing influence in the senior levels of
policymakers in Southeast Asia.
The lack
of a comprehensive understanding of the region can also result in the backfiring
of well-intentioned efforts by creating suspicion of American influence over—or
worse, intervention in— domestic affairs amongst the target population.
The
United States, therefore, needs to cultivate homegrown Southeast Asia
specialists for the long term.
Security—Nontraditional
and Traditional Issues
The
emergent question of securitizing transnational issues such as climate change,
environmental damage, and pandemics has received urgent attention in recent
times, due in large part to globalization, information technology, travel, and
the media.
Commonly
referred to as nontraditiona security (NTS) issues, they lend themselves to
wider regional and multilateral cooperation in the face of inadequate national
and bilateral responses.
The 1997
Asian financial crisis, for example, led to the formation of the ASEAN+3 and
prompted the acceleration of regional financial cooperation through various
initiatives.
It is
unclear just how nontraditional these threats for the region are, as many of
them, such as terrorism and other transnational crimes, have long plagued the
security domain of Southeast Asian countries.
The
distinction between nontraditional and traditional threats is further blurred
when militaries are used to combat the former, and fraudulent financial
transactions, for example, are used to fund terrorism.
It may,
however, be possible to adopt the NTS approach to resolve certain threats such
as pandemics.
This
would have the benefit of involving interested nonstate actors such as civil
society and the business community.
Whether
regional security architectures can be built around NTS issues remains to be
seen, but there has already been increasing penetration of those issues into
regional structures such as the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community.
Even
ASEAN+3, which was originally a financial and economic process, has discussed
women’s issues and poverty.
Likewise,
APEC’s agenda expanded to consider security matters post-September 11,
2001.
While
there have been a number of achievements in NTS cooperation, including ASEAN’s
campaign against intellectual property piracy and an improved level of
international and interagency cooperation in combating an avian flu pandemic,
other areas deserve prioritization.
Climate
change, for example, relates to the survival of island states.
The
issue is particularly crucial for Southeast Asia as much of the population in
the region depends on agriculture.
The
destruction of whole archipelagos, such as the Pacific Islands, would have
serious implications for migration and resource security in the region. US
assistance could, in particular, be lent to the areas of clean technology,
reforestation, and nuclear energy.
The
Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate’s (AP6) initiative
in cleaner burning technologies was triggered by pollution problems caused by
coalburning in China and India.
This
could be expanded to Indonesia if it joins the AP6. The United States could also
extend its technical expertise in ensuring public safety in the production and
handling of nuclear energy.
There
are encouraging trends for cooperation among the regional powers in the
traditional security domain, especially with deeper economic integration in the
region.
China
and India have embarked on confidence-building measures since 1993 to resolve
their Himalayan border dispute, and the United States has expressed openness to
the idea of China sharing responsibility in protecting its sea lanes through the
development of the Republic’s own blue water navy.
Additionally,
China-Japan relations are warming up, and India and the United States’ civil
nuclear agreement—although controversial—is a significant symbol of closer
ties.
Major
power relations in Southeast Asia have also impacted the United States’ treaty
allies in the region.
While
Thailand has engaged with the United States since the 19th century, it was also
China’s strategic partner in the 18th century when approximately three million
Chinese went to Bangkok.
In more
recent times, both powers have contributed to Thailand’s development, but
their competing strategies on the political and security fronts have sometimes
pulled Thailand in different directions.
For the
first time, Thailand will break with tradition and purchase major weapons from
Ukraine and Sweden rather than the United States.
The
suggestion is that for Southeast Asia to attract and sustainWashington’s
engagement in the region, it must build up and modernize its militaries.
This
would apply to the United States’ treaty allies, in particular, since defense
has long been the backbone of those relations.
Changing
Regional Security Architecture
The
reality facing Southeast Asia is that China will only continue to grow in the
region and any relationship that it has with a rising China must, for practical
purposes, be positive.
The
argument for increased US engagement in the region is that, in its absence,
Southeast Asian countries will only move closer toward China.
The
question for US consideration is, therefore, whether it will be prepared to move
beyond its preference for bilateral ties, or for APEC as a multilateral security
forum.
APEC is
primarily a grouping of economies, rather than states, and APEC’s ability to
discuss wide-ranging strategic issues is limited by the participation of Hong
Kong and Taiwan.
Although
ASEAN+3 was born of the 1997 financial crisis, its role has grown to constitute
a new sort of security architecture.
The
Chiang Mai Initiative became multilateral in 2006 and has doubled in size since
then.
Now it
operates with the cooperation of the IMF.
Those
sympathetic to calls for greater involvement by the United States in the region
argue that it would be in the US interest to protect its commercial and business
interests there.
Despite
widespread agreement that the United States remains engaged in Southeast Asia in
many different areas, particularly in business, there are sustained calls for
the United States to become a formal part of the region’s institutions,
especially if the EAS is reconstituted as a forum for the discussion of
strategic regional issues.
This
would, however, require the United States to sign ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation (TAC).
The
proponents of US accession to the TAC argue that apart from a symbolic
recognition of the multilateralism of security and the way Southeast Asia views
security, the United States would be in a direct position to shape regional
institutions and structures.
It would
also help maintain stability in a region that is a major market and security
arena for the United States.
In a
region where perceptions matter, the United States’ signing of the TAC would
reflect its view of Southeast Asia as an equal.
With
Washington preferring product over process, however, the onus would be on ASEAN
to provide more than anecdotal evidence that it is more than a “talking shop.”
If the
United States did join the EAS, it would be difficult for the group to deny
Russia a place there.
From the
standpoint of having an inclusive structure, membership by both Russia and the
United States would be a positive development.
However,
domestic politics not only in these two countries but also in China may
complicate the building of a new Asian security architecture.
The
status quo seems to be that there is some dissatisfaction. Because the region is
unclear as to the exact security architecture that the present situation
warrants, existing alliances continue while new ones falter.
A
difference in the conception of security also contributes to this disconnect.
While the United States tends to think in terms of hard security, Southeast Asia
thinks in terms of comprehensive security.
To
contribute to regional security and stability in the near term, the United
States should:
1. Pay
more attention to capacity-building in regional countries, particularly in soft
and technical skills such as law enforcement training and NTS threat management.
Reassess the bilateral-multilateral dynamic in US security policy in Southeast
Asia.
2. This
process would offer insights into an appropriate role for the United States in
the region’s changing security frameworks, as well as update the bilateral
alliances that thus far have been based largely on US military deployments and
cooperation.
3. Focus
on energy security in several dimensions, e.g., ensuring greater safeguards for
civilian nuclear energy regimes and encouraging cleaner and more efficient use
of coal.
4.
Develop its own cadre of Southeast Asia specialists intimately familiar with the
nuances of politics and culture in the region.
5.
Continue and encourage the trend toward greater intelligence cooperation. This
has the multiple effects of enhancing security in the region, promoting defense
and security transparency, and increasing confidence- building measures among
the major powers.
The
Stanley Foundation
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Stanley Foundation seeks a secure peace with freedom and justice, built on world
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brings fresh voices, original ideas, and lasting solutions to debates on global
and regional problems.
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foundation is a nonpartisan, private operating foundation, located in Muscatine,
Iowa, that focuses on peace and security issues and advocates principled
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Online
at www.stanleyfoundation.org.
The Stanley Foundation encourages use of this report for educational
purposes.
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of the material may be duplicated with proper acknowledgment. Additional copies
are available.
This
report is available at http://reports.stanleyfoundation.org.
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