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On Right Column.*
MaximsNews
Contributor
Jeffrey
Laurenti

A
Security Council Numbers Game: All Bets Off

Jeffrey Laurenti is a senior fellow in
international affairs at The Century Foundation.
He
is an expert in international
security, international law and multilateral
institutions. He is a Contributor to MaximsNews.com.
Please see his bio below. This article
first appeared on The Century Foundation website.
JeffreyLaurenti@MaximsNews.com
UNITED NATIONS - 31 July 2005 / www.MaximsNews.com
/ "Et
tu, Brute?"
These dying words of
Julius Caesar, as he saw his supposed friend and ally Brutus
advancing, dagger in hand, to join in his murder, could have
been on the lips of Japanese diplomats last week.
The
Bush administration's unexpectedly sharp rejection on July
13 of their plan to add a half-dozen permanent members to
the United Nations Security Council has derailed Japan's
hard fought campaign, along with Brazil, Germany, and India,
to gain access to the inner circle of the world's premiere
political body.
Their
drive was already in trouble.
The normally
discreet Chinese had already cast aside their
customary inscrutability in April to denounce a
permanent seat for Japan.
African
countries abruptly announced their support
depended on a deal-breaking condition - that new
Security Council permanent members must
immediately have the same veto power as the five
existing permanent members.
But the Americans'
blunt repudiation came as a shock.
The
administration was right to refuse support for a
promiscuous expansion of the Council's size.
In
their quest for the votes of 127 U.N. member
states -- the two-thirds majority necessary to
amend the U.N. Charter -- the four aspirants to
permanent status had agreed to add not only
permanent seats for themselves, but two more for
undetermined African countries.
On
top of that, they proposed to expand by four the
10 existing seats elected by the General
Assembly for two-year terms, adding one each for
Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America.
A
membership of 25 would, Americans across the
spectrum have agreed, be much too large for an
emergency-response executive committee like the
Security Council.
Even
the Clinton administration, which actively
promoted adding more heavyweight states to the
Security Council, fixed 20 as maximum size it
could accept.
The
four aspirants have expressed incredulity about
Washington's adamance on size, but none of them
has had to assemble an international coalition
to take or enforce hard decisions in the
Security Council.
The
United States uniquely has had to put together
those votes and, at times, the muscle needed to
implement them, in crises as varied as Kuwait,
Haiti, and Bosnia.
It
is not easy to assemble and sustain majorities
for tough action, at any level of politics; and
when a measure of coercion may be involved, many
countries' political leaders turn
faint-hearted.
It
is hard enough, seasoned American diplomats have
found, to be an effective "majority
leader" among 15; they shudder at the
prospect of doubling the number of countries
they would have to court in a crisis.
To
be sure, even at 15 members Washington cannot
control the current sized Council.
Its
members overwhelmingly rejected what they saw as
George Bush's flimsily justified war against
Iraq, and they closed ranks to force him to
accept the International Criminal Court's
activation on Darfur.
But
25 would, most U.N. observers acknowledge, risk
converting the United Nations' crisis management
organ into yet another U.N. talk shop.
So
would the Africans' demand for vetoes for new
permanent members.
While
the "Group of Four" aspirants all want
equal veto status with the 1945 permanent
members, they recognized such a demand would be
unanimously rebuffed by all five, whose
ratifications are required for a U.N. Charter
amendment to take effect.
So
they opted to get permanently onto the Council
first, and then come back for the veto
entitlement in fifteen years, under a provision
for mandatory reconsideration of the Council's
makeup.
But
the Africans-who in the normal optic of
geopolitics bring the least power resources to
the table-see the veto differently, as we have
recently explained
elsewhere.
The
main reason for them to give up their cherished
attachment to the absolute equality of all
states -- pygmies accorded equal weight as
giants -- is the hope that if some African
governments have a veto, they can use it as
bargaining leverage with the United States: Do X
or Y for African crises, or we will block your
urgent calls for action in crisis A or B.
But
if the United States is ready to work around the
U.N. Security Council when a large continental
power like Russia threatens a veto on something
like Kosovo, the notion that it will bargain
with a Nigeria rather than bypass the whole
institution seems surreal.
For
most member states, the problem with the
Security Council is not that it has too few
members that can unilaterally thwart the
collective will of nations, but that at five it
already has too many.
The
African demand for vetoes has thus unraveled the
tenuous two-thirds majority that diligent
diplomacy by the Japanese, Germans, Indians, and
Brazilians had hoped to assemble.
The
"cappuccino club" of major
peacekeeping contributors that the expansion
resolution would have marginalized-led by Italy
and Pakistan, and including such other pillars
of peacekeeping as Canada, Argentina, Korea,
Spain, and (waveringly) Egypt -- had marshaled
opposition to the very notion of expanded
permanence.
The
American call to vote down the resolution was
just the coup
de grace.
What
next?
The
aspirants for permanent membership have vowed to
bring their resolution back in the fall session
of the General Assembly, but it is hard to
imagine that the September summit will endorse
their plan.
The
fallback, if any revision is to happen in the
coming year, will likely be the model that
Secretary-General Kofi Annan's high-level panel
on global security recommended last year, which
the four aspirants to permanency fiercely
rejected as inadequate to their global standing:
the addition of several heavyweight countries,
scattered among the major regions, elected to
specially extended terms, until a mandatory
revisiting of the Security Council's makeup
after 2020.
Perhaps
the respective regions might provide for some
interim terms of 15 years, to spare sensitive
foreign ministries the humiliation of seeking
reelection in the meantime.
But
what the Security Council needs is not so much a
rearrangement of its furniture and name plates
as a much tighter link between Council
membership and a firm obligation to commit
troops on the ground when Council members adopt
a decision.
None
of the reform proposals for 2005 have dared to
address this fundamental disconnect between
power to decide and responsibility to
implement.
That
is what real Security Council reform needs to
address.
Jeffrey
Laurenti
Jeffrey Laurenti is a senior fellow in
international affairs at The Century
Foundation. He is an expert in
international security, international law and
multilateral institutions.
He is
the author of numerous monographs on
international peace and security, terrorism,
U.N. reform, and international narcotics policy.
He has authored articles for The Christian
Science Monitor, The Washington Post,
Chicago Tribune, New York Newsday,
and the Los Angeles Times, and
international policy journals.
As a senior
advisor to the United Nations Foundation,
Laurenti has served as deputy director of the
United Nations and Global Security initiative
the foundation established, with backing from
The Century Foundation, to support the debate on
international security of the High-Level Panel
on Threats, Challenges, and Change commissioned
by the United Nations Secretary-General.
Laurenti was executive director of policy
studies at the United Nations Association of the
United States until 2003, currently serves on
the Association’s Board of Directors, and also
is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.
He was candidate for the US House of
Representatives in 1986, senior issues advisor
to the Mondale/Ferraro campaign and from 1978 to
1984, was Executive Director of the New Jersey
Senate. Previously, he was a program officer for
The Century Foundation, then the Twentieth
Century Fund.
Jeffrey
Laurenti is a Contributor to MaximsNews.com.
JeffreyLaurenti@MaximsNews.com
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