|
|
||||
|
Today's News from the U.N. and the World, visit: MaximsNews.com Established 1999. Please
CONFIRM your free Subscription
to MaximsNews:
MaximsNews Columnist
Publisher's Note: Last year Dr. Blix received the United Nations Correspondents Association 2004 UNCA Citizen of the World Award. To read excerpts and to purchase his book, Disarming Iraq, please visit: http://www.maximsnews.com/hansblix22march2004.htm. Dr Blix contributed this column to www.MaximsNews.com; he delivered it earlier as a speech in Mexico, January 2005.
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Terrorism, Global Security by Hans Blix
Global security, which I shall talk about, used to mean the security of states from being attacked by other states. However,
as a high level panel appointed by
Secretary-General Kofi Annan has argued in
its recent report on ‘a more secure
world’ global security must extend to
protection against hunger, global disease
and environmental disasters. After the catastrophe in South Asia we now rightly discuss better tsunami warning systems. We also discuss how the strong global will to help can be more effectively coordinated. One
conclusion emerging is that the UN and its
various organizations, which the world
community’s has created for common tasks,
are the instruments best placed to bring
about cooperation with the recipient
countries, better preparation and
coordination of international help. The terrorist attacks on the US by non-state actors on 11 September 2001 also raised grave questions about security, the prevention of terrorism through cooperative action and the role of the UN in these efforts. Although no sophisticated weapons were used on 9/11 the discussion in the US and many countries soon came to focus on the risk of terrorists and irresponsible governments using weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). President Bush was reported last year as saying that 9/11 was the Pearl Harbour of the Third World War – that against terrorism. It is still not uncommon to hear US leaders affirm that WMDs falling into the hands of ‘rogue states’ or terrorists are the greatest threats facing the world. In Europe the terrorist threats are recognized as requiring extensive new measures of protection and cooperation but European elections are not about which party is most energetic in combating terrorists or ‘rogue states’. If we go to other continents WMDs and terrorism are for most people and politicians somewhat remote problems. The priority items on their agendas are other security problems: hunger, poverty, disease. Personally I am as concerned about the long-term global environmental threats to man’s security, notably global warming, as I am about the short-term threats of WMDs. Restraints
on the use of force. A historical
perspective The welcome recognition that there is a broad range of security problems, which the global community must tackle, does not reduce the need to focus on the more traditional problem– that of security against the use of force between states, and the more modern problems– those of security against the use of WMDs and against force used by non-state actors. Being the Chairman of an international Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction and hoping to present a report early next year, I, for one, certainly recognize their relevance. A historical perspective may help us to understand the problems we face today. Wars
are no longer likely to be waged for the
grabbing of territory When we look back in history we can see that quests for territory have been one of the main causes of war. How many armed conflicts have not taken place between Germans and French over the river Rhine in Europe and between Russians and Chinese over the Amur River in Asia? We can also see that ideological aims have been behind many other armed campaigns, e.g. Christian crusades, colonial campaigns for the conversion of people to Christianity or Islamic jihads against infidels. I think these two main causes of armed conflicts between states are disappearing. My optimism does not rest on confidence that people will be any wiser than in the past. Rather I believe that whether we want it or not the gradual global integration that is being brought about by the technical, economic, and information evolution is gluing us together. The increased
interdependence and proximity will push
relations between blocs and continents toward
peace. I admit there is some uncertainty. We can see today some unease between the US, long dominant in Asia and China as the fast rising economic giant of the region with India two steps behind. The Taiwan issue is not free from danger. Yet, the interdependence between continents, including the American and the Asian is increasing through vastly increased trade and financial relations and services. I will probably be criticized as naïve when I suggest that perhaps Saddam Hussein’s war against Iran in the 1980s and his effort to seize space in the Shatt-el-Arab and his occupation of Kuwait were among the last cases of inter-state aggression for the old fashioned purpose of grabbing territory. UN
collective security system inoperative
against Communist expansion During the many years of the Cold War the Communist camp sought to expand territorially in the name of ideology and the collective security system of the UN Charter was mostly inoperative. While it authorized the Security Council to take action against threats to the peace and breaches of the peace any one of the five permanent members could prevent action by casting or threatening to cast a veto. In this situation the states of the world mostly had to find their security not through the UN but through the right to individual or collective self-defense, through alliances or neutrality. The
end of Communism brought détente and a new
security situation After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of Communism the security situation has changed drastically. There is continued détente between all big powers and blocs – if, indeed, one can speak of blocs any more. There are no significant territorial or ideological conflicts between them. All claim to pursue the market economy of various shapes and shades as their economic model. All are bent on pragmatism and none on ideological conquest. Many states in Europe are
reorienting their armed forces from defense
of their own territory to use in joint
international peace-keeping or
peace-enforcing operations. The détente helped to strengthen security globally and in several regions in Africa and Central America tensions and conflicts disappeared. During the Cold War nuclear capability had spread beyond the P 5 of the Security Council to Israel, India, Pakistan and South Africa. After the end of the Cold War the Ukraine and Kazakhstan transferred their nuclear weapons to Russia. Argentina, Brazil, Algeria committed themselves legally to non-proliferation and South Africa became the first country to roll back from a nuclear weapon status. I shall come later to the less welcome cases of Iraq and North Korea. At the United Nations and in international organizations détente made it possible to achieve many things together, which earlier had been impossible. A great many peace-keeping
missions were authorized by the Security
Council, where the use of the veto
became rare. In
the fields of arms control and disarmament
the global détente brought several
welcome results, above all the conclusion of
the Chemical
Weapons Convention, the
signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
and the expectation that agreement would be
reached to stop all production of highly
enriched uranium and plutonium for more
nuclear weapons (FMCT):
the so called ‘cut off’. The most important joint UN action made possible by the new climate of détente was, of course, the authorization given to the broad alliance created by President Bush the elder to intervene in 1991 to stop Iraq’s naked aggression against and occupation of Kuwait. For some time the action gave hope to the world that a new will of governments to cooperate would at long last bring the collective security system of the Charter to life. I should note the view of skeptics, however that the action would hardly have come about, if it had not been for concern that Saddam Hussein, already controlling huge oil reserves, might seek to control those of the whole Gulf region. The
discoveries in Iraq in 1991 undermined the
confidence in the NPT The UN authorized intervention in Iraq under US leadership was, as I noted encouraging showing what détente, cooperation and the notion of collective security could achieve. However, the IAEA inspectors who were sent into Iraq after the cease fire made the discovery that Iraq, a state which was a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and had committed itself not to acquire nuclear weapons had, in fact, an advanced program for the enrichment of uranium and for the production of nuclear weapons. Later, UNSCOM inspectors brought evidence of a significant program for biological weapons and even of the testing of B-weapons. These discoveries could not but shake the confidence in the reliability of the NPT and the safeguards verification system which was meant to deter and detect cheating. When in the same period already the earliest IAEA inspectors in North Korea concluded that the DPRK had not declared all the plutonium it had produced the question was inevitably asked whether the NPT was like a big Swiss cheese full of holes. Was the world being lulled into false confidence? What further unpleasant surprises would there be? Work started to bring about a drastic strengthening of the IAEA safeguards inspections – efforts that led in 1997 to the adoption of new protocols for much more effective inspection. Nevertheless, the events seem to have weakened the US dedication to and reliance on global arms control agreements and given rise to ideas about a policy of more active unilateral counter-proliferation. The concept was not terribly well defined but it certainly comprised options of special armed operations. The Israeli bombing raid destroying the OSIRAK reactor in Iraq in 1981 is the example that comes to mind. The many years during which Saddam Hussein played cat and mouse with UN inspectors despite occasional punishing bombing raids by the US and the UK presumably further eroded the US confidence that international economic sanctions and inspection would bring credible assurance about the absence of any weapons of mass destruction. Before 9/11 2001 neither the US nor any other members of the Security Council suspected that there was any Iraqi nuclear threat in the foreseeable future. Although there were suspicions that Saddam retained some biological or chemical weapons and missiles, Saddam was, as it was said, “kept in his box”. Nevertheless, to the US, as the rapidly growing only military superpower, Saddam Hussein – a brutal medieval ruler with modern weapons – must have appeared as an intolerable defiance. The temptation to go from containing him to replacing him was there. Regime change was desired but there was no clear casus belli. How
did the non-existent WMDs become the casus
belli? We now know that in all likelihood Iraq destroyed most weapons of mass destruction in the summer of 1991. Some, which had been declared were destroyed under UNSCOM supervision. Yet, Iraq behaved as if it might still have prohibited weapons. Why? There might have been several reasons. · For one thing, Saddam would often hear that sanctions would not be lifted unless he, himself, disappeared. This could not have given him much incentive to cooperate. He could just as well be obstructive. · Secondly, Iraq knew that UNSCOM teams often comprised “experts” seconded from national intelligence organizations and reporting not to the UN but to these organizations. It cannot have stimulated the will to cooperation. · Thirdly, just as you may scare people from your house by hanging a sign reading “beware of dog” without having a dog Saddam Hussein might have wanted to scare Iran and others in the region and to stand tall and dangerous in the Arab world… Regardless what might have been the most important reason for the difficulties raised against the inspectors, the US and the world suspected that the Iraqi conduct was linked to the existence of hidden WMDs. By the autumn of 2002 Iraq had been without inspection for nearly four years and it was widely thought that despite sanctions and economic hardship Iraq could have begun to revive its programs of WMDs. These suspicions were fed nourishment by Iraqi defectors, who wished to see US military action against Saddam. Their messages and contrived information were warmly received by groups in Washington, which were eager to see a US friendly regime in Iraq. Their reasons may well have varied a great deal. Stationing of US troops in Iraq could be less problematic than in Saudi Arabia and could be useful as a pressure upon Iran. The oil supplies of Iraq were important for future US imports. Lack
of plausible casus belli against IRAQ While the US armed action against Afghanistan had been justified by the Taliban regime’s hosting the authors of the terrorist attacks on 9/11 solid justifications for an armed attack on Iraq were not easily found. The allegations about Iraqi links to terrorists and about the existence illegal WMD programs never had much substance. However, the old recipe was followed: when the argument is weak, raise the voice! The intelligence organizations, for the most part abandoned their role as coldly seeking, investigating and analyzing information, and gave the war- bent political leaders in the US and the UK the hand that they looked for if not explicitly asked for. Today the organizations probably regret that they shed some of their professionalism. Who will believe them next time they cry wolf? The period of UN and IAEA inspections in Iraq was not welcomed by all in Washington but probably made necessary politically and because of British insistence. Vice President Cheney said simply that inspection was worse than useless and he told Dr. ElBaradei (of the IAEA) and myself that the US would not hesitate to “discredit” the inspections “in favour of disarmament”. I do not believe that the armed intervention that took place in March 2003 was irrevocably determined in 2002. Events could have occurred which might have stopped the train, e.g. if Saddam had gone into exile. Nevertheless, it is clear that the military planning was made to allow the action to go forward in the spring of 2003. While on the one hand the US was helpful to the inspection organizations the governmental leadership must have found it greatly irritating and inconvenient that well functioning and professional international inspections found ‘no smoking guns.’ It appears that some in the US leadership had become so convinced of their own uncritical arguments about WMDs that they believed the inspectors were lying. If the US wanted to ignore that UN inspections did not confirm US allegations other states took the view that the inspections should continue. What was the hurry? As Mexico and other members of the Security Council experienced tremendous pressure was exerted on members of the Council to support armed action. There was less pressure on the inspectors although we were expressing skepticism against some intelligence information which we were able to check – including some that Colin Powell presented to the Security Council. One reason might have been that we had no vote. The
unleashing of the war. The lack of
justifications The official legal justifications of the war have been that Iraq had violated a number of resolutions of the Security Council and that action was taken to “uphold the authority of the Council”. However, it seems strange that individual members of the Council could have the right to uphold an authority that the majority does not want to exercise. If the US, UK and Spain had such an authority to intervene presumably Russia, China, France and Germany could have taken action – different action. It seems evident to me that it was for he Council as a whole to decide and that the Council was ignored. The main political justification of the war was that Iraq had illegally retained weapons of mass destruction and that these constituted a threat to the US, the UK and the world. However, the closer we got to the day of unleashing the armed action the weaker the less credible the evidence looked. A contract between Iraq and Niger for the import of uranium oxide and mentioned by President Bush in his state of the Union message, was shown to have been a forgery… If inspections had continued for another few months we would have been able to inspect all sites suspected by intelligence organizations and – as there were no weapons – we would have found them empty and so reported to the Security Council and to those who had given us the tips. The
war might not have been waged. However, the war was unleashed. The security system of the UN was ignored and a counter-proliferation action was undertaken to identify and eliminate WMDs -- which did not exist. The Iraq Survey Group, which was established by the CIA to look for the weapons has recently made it known that no weapons can be found and that it makes no further efforts. I cannot resist the reflection that the war and the ISG operation was a very costly way of concluding that there were no WMDs. In terms of lives and
suffering, property and money. The UN
inspections cost some 80 million US dollars
for a year. By May 2003 a large number of Iraqi engineers, scientists and military had been interrogated by the US and despite awards of various kinds no one had been able to point to any stocks of illegal weapons. It was then clear that there were no such weapons. UN interviews had taken place earlier but in a state still under totalitarian control. The denials we had met had not have the same evidentiary value. The
impact of the IRAQ invasion on the
collective security system of the UN From the viewpoint of the collective security system of the UN Charter, the extent to which the United States has claimed that it is free to take armed action is worrisome. It is not only against an “armed attack” that occurs – a right that is recognized in Article 51 of the UN Charter. The US has explained that in the era of weapons of mass destruction, long range missiles and terrorist groups, it feels at liberty to take armed action in ‘anticipatory self-defense’ not only where it deems an attack “imminent” but also– as President Bush has said repeatedly – where it sees a “a growing danger”. What is a ‘growing danger?’ Considering the surprise terror attacks on the United States in 2001 all governments would probably maintain that they would see it as their duty to their own populations to take action – if need be even unilateral armed action – to seek to prevent a terror attack that they learnt was coming. They would not ask for a “permission slip” from the Security Council. There are, however, two crucial problems with the claim of a right to such anticipatory self-defense: · Before an attack has taken place, the knowledge about it is likely to depend upon intelligence. The Iraq affair does not give much confidence about national intelligence as a reliable basis. Where it turns out that the basis is erroneous, then what is meant to be anticipatory self-defense may become a totally unjustified attack. · Although “imminence” may be a severe time requirement, “a growing threat” would be an unacceptably lax criterion and would not tally with the generally accepted position that force should only be used only as a last resort. It has been suggested that in the current review of the functioning of the UN an effort should be made to reformulate article 51 of the Charter to give some room for preemptive action. The high level panel that has recently reported to Kofi Annan rejects the suggestion. It warns that any widening of the right to self defense will be open to abuse by all states. I agree with this view and find it more likely that an answer to the question when unilaterally decided self-defense is acceptable to the world community will slowly emerge through precedents. Contrary to US contentions before the Iraq war the position of the Security Council will prove relevant. It is also important, however, as Kofi Annan has noted, that the Security Council actively consider and monitor threats posed by possible weapons of mass destruction, giving all members the feeling that the issue is taken seriously and that there is a readiness to take joint action, where there is convincing evidence of a threat that is significant and near in time. The new US security agenda has emphasized counter-proliferation and pre-emption, if need be through unilateral military action. Although use of international organizations, like the UN or the IAEA, has continued, the reliance on and cooperation through formal treaty alliances and instruments and agreements seem to have been deemphasized. It is also as if the US administration and a large part of US media today felt insulted that the majority of the Security Council refused to endorse the armed intervention in Iraq, an intervention that most countries in the world and most people in the world – including possibly a majority of Americans – consider was an error or something much worse. Where are we going next? I shall first discuss the WMD threats linked to terrorist groups and thereafter the threats from WMDs in the hands of states. How
is the world to meet the threats and actions
of terrorist groups? The first point to make, I think, is that terrorists do not live on clouds but must have their feet on the territory of states. It is important that the international community upholds the principle that each government is obliged to ensure that its territory is not used as a base for attacks on other states. It is legally correct and practically and politically sound. If there is a failure in this duty, then the world will endorse forcible intervention – as it did with the Taliban government in Afghanistan. Second, broad international efforts must continue to ensure the safe keeping of nuclear and other dangerous material and equipment everywhere in the world to reduce the availability of such material and equipment. If the Pakistan government had exercised better control of its nuclear sector, Mr. Khan’s shop for nuclear weapon designs and centrifuges would not have been in its dangerous business. A resolution by the Security Council – Res. 1540 (2004) – urges more cooperation between states and more action by states to prevent proliferation of WMDs. A new interesting feature is that it demands of states not only to take specific action but also to adopt legislation prohibiting non-state actors from acquiring or producing WMDs. Third, what is mostly needed immediately is intensified international cooperation in the day-to-day field work of the national intelligence, police and financial institutions of states to trace persons, resources, weapons and dangerous material. There seems to be a somewhat futile debate whether the combating of terrorism is a task for law enforcement organizations or the military. In most cases using military means would be like deploying cannons against mosquitoes. One of the purposes claimed for the military invasion of Iraq was to counteract Iraq’s alleged promotion of Al Qaeda and other terrorists groups. If this was really an aim, it failed miserably. US official inquiries have shown no such promotion by Iraq. It is evident rather that the occupation has stimulated terrorism and that brutal or illegal response measures, in this case as in similar cases – at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo as in Chechnya – breed further terrorism and risks driving large numbers of civilians, otherwise not favourable to the extremists, to support them. After a 9/11 or a Beslan massacre the mood is simply to punish the perpetrators and to eradicate the responsible group. Yet, it is rational to ask why the terrorists commit such atrocities. To be sure, their motives vary and many will be muddled or absurd. However, if reasonable non-armed measures can be taken, which reduce incentives to terrorism, they should be on the agenda, whether they are in the fields of economic or social development or greater autonomy for particular groups or regions. It is not pandering to terrorism but simply rational. States
and WMDs Even though there is concern that terrorist groups may get hold of and employ nuclear weapons, the concern is much more acute about nuclear weapons in the hands of states. The attempted violations by the NPT-parties DPRK, Iraq and Libya come to mind and also the suspected but denied violation by Iran, which is also a party to the NPT. How should the world community tackle these questions? It is Iran and North Korea (DPRK) that today make us hold our breath and that raise a host of difficult questions and fears of domino effects should either acquire nuclear weapons. Both countries have acted in
disregard of their safeguards obligation. The
DPRK, which has renounced the NPT, has
claimed that it is ready to deter foreign
attacks by developing a nuclear weapon
capacity but it has also declared that it is
ready to “scrap” such capacity, if some
conditions are fulfilled, including
guarantees about security from attack. Iran has declared that its intention is only to use its legal right under the NPT to enrich uranium in order to make fuel for its own power reactors. It has also signaled that while it cannot accept being deprived of this right it might consider voluntarily suspending some activities, including enrichment, if the quid pro quo was sufficient. In both cases a number of states are at the present time seeking solutions through negotiations. This is welcome. The war that was waged in Iraq is not a model that many want to see followed. Solutions for the DPRK and IRAN must aim at ensuring that both states renounce all nuclear activities through which bomb grade material could be produced and that they accept comprehensive verification. The minimum in that regard would be full acceptance of the additional safeguards agreements of the IAEA. To induce them to make such commitments will require some attractive quid pro quo. As regards the DPRK I submit it might be wise to make the economic part of the package attractive by constructing it in a way that would help the country to gradually exit from the system that has brought it to misery and starvation. China would be the model. With Iran a temporary arrangement seems to have been attained. However, a more definite understanding is still needed. The economic part of a longer term agreement with Iran will need to cover trade and investment relations, perhaps support for WTO membership. If Iran is to forego the investments it has made in infrastructure for an indigenous production of enriched uranium for use in power reactors a multilateral assurance of supply of uranium fuel at market prices must evidently be given and seems, indeed, to be on the table. It is my belief that both in the case of Iran and the case of the DPRK some guarantees may need to be given about security against attacks from the outside. The potential consequences of DPRK and/or Iran acquiring nuclear weapons are very serious. Let me focus on the case of Iran and say, first that in my view it is not surprising that many countries in the world have suspected Iran of intending to move to nuclear weapons or, at least, to a near nuclear weapon status. Iran built infrastructure for the enrichment of uranium disregarding the need for transparency and disregarding express obligations under its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Although Iran assures the world that it intends to enrich uranium only to the level needed for its own power reactor fuel, it could later go to a concentration needed for weapons. Iran has further engaged in building a large heavy water research reactor and plants to produce the heavy water needed. This type of reactor is deemed convenient for the production of plutonium, provided that a reprocessing capacity is available, which does not seem to be the case at the present time. This is not, however, a full picture. It has been said by some critics that there is no justification for Iran as an oil rich country to build nuclear power plants. This, I think, is almost a colonialist argument. Why should not an oil rich country produce electricity by nuclear power and sell the oil it thereby saves for good income in the world market? The argument was never advanced when the Shah was still in Iran and the US and other states competed with each other to sell nuclear infrastructure to the country. It might be said with more reason that building an indigenous enrichment capacity to produce nuclear fuel for a few reactors is not necessary and might not be economic. My own country, Sweden has eleven nuclear power reactors generating around 10000 MW(e) and does not enrich the fuel it needs but buys it in the world market. It might be more economic. At the same time, it must be admitted, it makes for dependence on outside suppliers. When it is urged – wisely in my view – that Iran should refrain from all activities, even though per se legal, which may be bring it closer to a capacity to make weapons useable material Iran can ask for something in return. Her we are in the world of diplomatic carrots and sticks. The diplomatic game is still on – which is better than seeing it off. Newspaper speculations about the bombing of Iranian installations and about Iranian retaliation are added features in the game. Let us hope that all sides feel the seriousness of the situation. Concluding
remarks: the way forward I confess I see dangers on the road traveled in the last few years by the US administration. Further exploration of new types of American nuclear weapons will not, I think, induce others to disarm and to renounce weapons options that are technically open to them. There may be more weapons and conflicts rather than less on this road. By contrast, a resumption of the kind of leadership that the US used to exercise in the arms control and disarmament fields would, I think, be greeted with enthusiasm by the whole world and could lead all away from WMDs and toward greater security. I shall suggest some actions that I think would lead out of the current stalemate: · More attention should be devoted to solving the political, security and social problems that almost invariably underlie the development or acquisition of WMDs; this is true for Iran and the DPRK. · US ratification of a comprehensive test ban treaty would be likely to have a positive domino effect, including China, India, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq and Israel. It would make the development of new types of nuclear weapons much more difficult. Continued non-ratification could have high costs. · The conclusion of a verified cut off of the production of fissionable material for weapons combined with agreements on reductions in the number of weapons would gradually reduce the deadly arsenals. · A greater reliance on independent and professional international inspection with broad rights to access on the ground and with some intelligence supplied by national authorities, would give governments, governing boards and the Security Council unbiased assessments. UNMOVIC, which I headed, might be given further functions by the Security Council in the Council’s proposed stronger engagement to counter WMDs.
For instance, as a subsidiary and
advisory body of the Council perhaps it
could perform challenge inspections in the fields of biological weapons and
missiles, where no inspection mechanisms
exist. · As someone who has been responsible for the operation of verification and inspection, may I conclude by saying that in foreign affairs, as in medicine, successful operations require critical thinking and correct diagnoses.
This thinking must aim at
establishing real
reality – not creating virtual
reality.
|
||||
|
|
