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Publisher's
Note: To read excerpts and to
purchase Dr. Blix’s book,
see
Disarming
Iraq. Dr Blix contributed this
column to www.MaximsNews.com;
he delivered it earlier as a speech at
the
Conference
at the Institut Francais des relations
internationales (IFRI),
17
October
2005. Dr.
Blix spoke in his capacity of chairman
of WMDC. The report that the commission
is preparing will be a collective
endeavour.
UNITED NATIONS -
18 November 2005 / www.MaximsNews.com/ Dag
Hammarskjold was born in Uppsala,
Sweden, 100 years ago. I am pleased to
note here in Paris that the French
government was instrumental in his
election as Secretary-General of the UN.
He demonstrated exceptional skill and
integrity and enabled the UN and the
office of the S-G to take on important
new tasks.
He
become famous for using the S-Gs office
for quiet diplomacy to help solve
various crises.
But he also used his office as a
platform to publicly criticize state
actions which, in his view, gravely
violated the UN Charter.
His most famous innovation was the idea and practice of
sending “UN helmets” to calm and
control areas of conflict. Peace keeping
was born under his watch and he died in
1961 on a visit to the UN peace keeping
mission to the Congo.
Hammarskjold
had a vision how the world community
could take on some of the features,
which allow states to maintain peace,
uphold the rule of law, promote economic
development and bring about greater
equality for their citizens.
I
agree with this thinking and believe
that in the very long run this is how
the world will develop. At the regional
level Europe is slowly but clearly
moving in this direction.
It
has been suggested that the US is like
an impatient Mars quick to use force to
solve problems, while Europe is like a
patient Venus, eschewing force and
endlessly negotiating to solutions.
Without denying that the use of force
may be indispensable sometimes I prefer
Venus. The whole world would do well to
become a bit more feminist.
In
the area of arms control the states of the
world is still like a primitive community in
which families, clans and tribes have their
own arms and use them to maintain peace by
deterrence and blood revenge. Not long ago
states also used their weapons to grab
territory or to spread one faith or another.
A
fundamental feature of the state community is
that a monopoly has been secured on the
possession and use of arms (apart from small
caliber arms). In most cases some chieftain or
king achieved it by martial means;
occasionally unification and power monopoly
was attained with the help of Venus and
marital vows. The monopoly on power and arms
came first. The rule of law controlling power
came later. Democracy came last.
The
question I now see is whether the monopoly on
arms and the use of arms in the international
community will be brought about by Mars or
Venus. In Europe Mars was at work from time
immemorial but the job has eventually been
done by Venus.
What
about arms control in the world?
Hammarskjold,
active during the Cold War, recognized that
the UN Charter’s outlawing of the use of
armed force ‘save in the common interest’
was undermined by the possibility to claim the
right to self-defense. The idea of collective
security written into the Charter must have
looked like a very remote vision in the 1960s,
when two heavily armed antagonistic blocks
stood against each other.
Hammarskjold
also recognized – naturally in the world of
military blocks – that direct disarmament
negotiations between a few key countries were
needed. The Big Powers with their security
interests, could not, he wrote,
‘automatically’ accept majority verdicts.
However, there should be an effort to balance
the interests.
Well,
we have seen in the past year how difficult it
is to achieve that balance. The UN summit, the
world’s largest ever gathering of heads of
states and governments, could not balance a
priority interest of a majority in getting
commitments about disarmament from the big
powers, notably the US, and the interest of
the US to commit all primarily to
non-proliferation and action against
terrorism.
Similarly,
at the NPT review conference a little earlier
this year no compromise could be attained.
Many non nuclear weapon states considered that
the US was walking back on commitments in the
field of disarmament and were, in such
circumstances, not willing to accede to US
requests.
I
find it hard to avoid the impression that
since the early 90s Mars has dominated the
scene in Washington and has an ambition not to
be restrained in his exercise of benign
dominant power in the world. For Mars the UN
must appear both as an undesirable restraint
and as a potential ally.
In
the US National Defense Strategy published earlier this year by the
Department of Defense, I find the following:
“Our
strength as a nation state will continue to be
challenged by those who employ a strategy of
the weak using international fora, judicial
processes, and terrorism.”
The
esteem for international organizations –
including, one would assume, the UN – and
judicial processes is evidently not very high,
when they are lumped together with terrorism
and seen mainly as obstacles.
The vision of the doctrine is a
different one. I quote:
”The
end of the cold war and our capacity to
influence global events open the prospects for
a new and peaceful state system in the
world.”
How
much room there is in this vision for the
concept and rules of collective security and a
reliance on and use of global institutions is
not clear. Recently, an article by one of the
chairmen of a bipartisan US congressional task
force on UN reform carried the title “A
limited UN is best for America” [IHT 13
Sept. 2005].
Global
institutions, like the UN, are not, of course,
the only churches working for peace in the
global village. Other multilateral,
unilateral, bilateral or regional action may
well be helpful to many or all – whether in
the field of disarmament or in the combat of
terrorism. I shall touch on some of them. Let
me first, however, illustrate how much of the
global disarmament effort has ground to a
halt.
The
Conference on Disarmament at Geneva has not
been able to agree on an agenda for many
years. This in a period of continued global détente!
At
the UN summit the US apparently objected to
any reference to “disarmament”, a term
that was deleted quite some time ago in the
organizational charts of the
US State Department.
·
Most
serious, in my view, is that the US at present
is determined not to ratify the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty. In all likelihood, a US
ratification would trigger a Chinese and a
Chinese would trigger an Indian, an Indian a
Pakistani and so on.
On the other hand, the informal
moratorium, which is currently observed, might
be broken. In the US there are groups, which
want to develop nuclear weapons with new
missions and to test. The freedom of action
seems to be valued higher than the risk that
the moratorium would break.
·
The
Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty, which would
stop the production of highly enriched uranium
and plutonium for weapons, is still supported
by the US, but it rejects any verification
claiming that it could not be reliable. It is
perfectly true that there will be
uncertainties in the amounts of HEU and Pu
that are produced in large installations but
inspections of installations are not the only
way to obtain confidence about compliance. One
is tempted to think that a reason for the
newly developed objection might in reality be
a wish to retain freedom and flexibility for
the future.
·
The
US has similarly flatly rejected a protocol on
verification of compliance prepared during
many years for the Convention against
Biological and Toxin Weapons. Again, there are
some valid objections and there might well be
reasons for some new or modified approaches.
Yet, it is hard to avoid the impression that
some doctrinal aversion to accepting outside
inspection is at play.
I
shall not prolong the list of global projects
that are currently at a dead end in the sphere
of arms control and disarmament [trilateral
could be mentioned]– in large part, I
think, due to a wish in the US administration
to avoid international inspection in the US
and to preserve flexibility and freedom of
action for itself, even at the risk of giving
others the same latitudes.
In
the sphere of nuclear weapons, some projects
of restraint are still alive in the global UN
sphere:
-
A
hint that they may also be deemed
insufficient in the case of North Korea
came a few days ago, when the US
negotiator suggested that the P 5 in the
Security Council might have a role in the
verification of a denuclearization in
North Korea. This is an intriguing idea,
which reminds me that in the autumn of
2002 a US draft resolution on inspections
in Iraq would give the P5 a dominant
influence over the inspections. I did not
think it would be wise to have guidance
from five powers with possibly five
different views.
-
-
Resolution
1540 of the Security Council is an
interesting innovation. Generally the
Council uses its power to adopt binding
decisions under Chapter VII of the Charter
for concrete actions or measures, like
sanctions. This resolution, however, is
used to oblige member states to adopt
internal legislation, to implement treaty
obligations (which they would be obliged
anyway to implement) and to set up
commissions to monitor and promote
implementation.
-
In
a world of very uneven effectiveness in
state action to implement international
obligations, for instance in the struggle
against terrorism, the resolutions should
be welcomed. It also illustrates in a
flash the power that exists in the United
Nations to bring about measures throughout
the whole world community of states. It is
not only legitimacy that
follows from decisions supported by UN
organs representing the global community
By acting within the UN and in accordance
with its rules results can be attained
that limited alliances of willing cannot
achieve.
-
-
The
demand to refer the case of Iran to the
Security Council is of a very different
nature. It certainly would constitute an
action that made use of available
procedures in the IAEA statute. However,
that a procedure is available does not
mean that it is necessarily wise to use
it. If the aim of the demand were to be to
demonstrate that the Council will not
agree on sanctions and to make a case for
the unilateral use of force, it would be
an unwise move. The
Israeli destruction of the OSIRAK reactor
in 1981 was condemned by the Security
Council. The
US maintained in the Council on that
occasion that
the peaceful means had not been exhausted.
-
-
The
efforts to persuade Iran voluntarily to
suspend activities
aimed at the enrichment of uranium
do not seem at all exhausted. Such an
agreement would be desirable and should be
possible to avoid an increase of tension.
Iran has hardly any strategic interest in
building an enrichment capacity of its own
and the project seems even less meaningful
in economic terms. However, much has been
invested and there is understandable pride
in the matter. Iran can request a
substantial quid pro quo for a voluntary
suspension.
In my view, the offers made so far
to Iran have been rather meager,
especially regarding security assurances
and especially when you compare with the
offers made to North Korea.
Some
proposals have been made in the past few years
seeking restrictions on the building of plants
for the enrichment of uranium and the
production of plutonium – fuel cycle
activities. Several of these proposals would
involve placing highly ambitious managerial
functions some international body, e.g.
deciding whether a state was in good standing
from the point of view of non-proliferation,
before granting a request to deliver low
enriched uranium fuel for power reactors. What
can now be purchased on an international
competitive market would thus become subject
to an international decision.
Why are these proposals made?
-
It
seems clear that they have been triggered
by the cases of North Korea and Iran. It
also seems clear that the general
proposals will not be of any importance to
influence the two countries in the ongoing
negotiations. They are much more likely to
be influenced by proposals to keep their
specific neighbourhood free from fuel
cycle activities.
-
-
It
is suggested more plausibly that if
nuclear power were to expand substantially
in the future to give the world more
electricity without adding CO2 to the
atmosphere, more plants may be needed to
produce the low enriched uranium needed.
It is argued that more such plants might
mean a greater risk for proliferation and
that restrictions might be prudent.
However, the risks lie rather far away and
contrary to what many seem to assume, the
world is not milling with would-be
proliferating states.
-
-
At
the present time the proposals appear to
me almost as distractions from the two
highly relevant and worrisome current
questions, namely, how to dissuade North
Korea and Iran from fuel cycle activities.
Further negotiations on these cases and
efforts to move toward peace on the Korean
peninsula and in the Middle East are, in
my view, more important than in any search
for further restrictions on fuel cycle
activities.
Let
me conclude by mentioning two arrangements
championed by the US and having no link to the
UN or other global institution.
·
SORT
is an understanding reached between the US and
Russia about the retiring of deployed
strategic nuclear weapons into storage.
Welcome as this is we must note that the
weapons need not be dismantled and there is no
verification mechanism. At first the US even
first balked at making it a binding agreement.
·
PSI
(the Proliferation Security Initiative) is an
arrangement under which states participating
may intercept ships or planes suspected of
illegal transport of items relevant to weapons
of mass destruction. Ambassador Bolton praised
it as being an ”activity” rather than what
he contemptuously called “a treaty based
bureaucracy”.
In substance it appears mainly as a
useful means of enforcing export restrictions
on wmd related items.
As
far is known it has only been applied with
results in one case, a German ship intercepted
on the way to Libya with enrichment related
equipment. Nevertheless, it is hailed as a
very major scheme, happily unrelated to any
existing UN organization or treaty. Perhaps
its greatest importance lies in the
cooperation that is calls for between
intelligence agencies.
HansBlix@MaximsNews.com
Dr.
Hans Blix was born in 1928 in Uppsala, Sweden.
He studied at the University of
Uppsala; at Columbia University, where he was
also a research graduate; and at Cambridge
University, where he received his Ph.D.
In
1959, he became Doctor of Laws at the
Stockholm University, and in 1960, was
appointed Associate Professor in International
Law.
He
has an Honorary Doctorate from Moscow State
University (1987) and is a recipient of the
Henry de Wolf Smyth Award (Washington, DC,
1988).
From
1963 to 1976, Dr. Blix was Head of Department
at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and served
as Legal Adviser on International Law.
In 1976, he became Under-Secretary of
State at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, in
charge of international development
cooperation.
He was appointed Minister for Foreign
Affairs in October 1978.
From
1961 until 1981, he was a member of Sweden's
delegation to the United Nations General
Assembly; and from 1962 to 1978, a member of
the Swedish delegation to the Conference on
Disarmament in Geneva.
He
served as Director General of the
International Atomic Energy Agency from 1981
to 1997.
He
has written several books on subjects
associated with international and
constitutional law and was a leader of the
Liberal Campaign Committee in favour of
retention of the Swedish nuclear energy
programme in the referendum in 1980.
Dr.
Blix was appointed to by the UN
Secretary-General in January 2000 and took up
his duties on 1 March 2000. He is now
the former Executive Chairman of United
Nations Monitoring, Verification and
Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC)
.
Currently
Hans Blix is the Chairman, Weapons of Mass
Destruction Commission
and Director-General Emeritus of the IAEA.
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