5647th
Meeting (PM)
SECURITY COUNCIL TOUGHENS
SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN, ADDS ARMS EMBARGO,
WITH UNANIMOUS ADOPTION OF
RESOLUTION 1747 (2007)
Further
Steps Promised if No Compliance Reported by IAEA
in 60 days;
Iran’s
Foreign Minister Says Pressure, Intimidation
Will Not Change Policy
Determined
to constrain Iran’s development of sensitive
technologies in support of its nuclear and
missile programmes, the Security Council today
widened the scope of its December 2006 sanctions
against Iran by banning the country’s arms
exports and freezing the assets and restricting
the travel of additional individuals engaged in
the country’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear
activities.
Unanimously
adopting resolution 1747 (2007), submitted by
France, Germany and the United Kingdom, the
Council affirmed its decision that Iran should,
without further delay, suspend all
enrichment-related and reprocessing activities,
including research and development, to be
verified by the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA).
Under
a related provision, the Council requested a
report within 60 days from the IAEA Director
General on whether Iran had established such
full and sustained suspension, as well as on the
process of Iranian compliance with all other
steps required by the Agency’s Board of
Governors and the other provisions of resolution
1737 (2006) and this resolution.
The
Council also called on all States to report to
the Committee set up in December to monitor
implementation of the sanctions first
established under resolution 1737, within 60
days of adoption of the present text, on the
steps they had taken to implement the provisions
that concerned them.
It
also expressed its conviction that the
suspension set out in resolution 1737, as well
as full, verified Iranian compliance with the
IAEA Board of Governor’s requirements, would
contribute to a diplomatic negotiated solution
that guaranteed that Iran’s nuclear programme
was for exclusively peaceful purposes.
In
that connection, the Council underlined the
willingness of the international community to
work positively for such a solution, and it
encouraged Iran, in conforming with those
provisions, to re-engage with the international
community and IAEA, stressing that such
engagement would be beneficial.
Welcoming
the continuous affirmation of the commitment of
China, France, Germany, Russian Federation,
United Kingdom and United States, with the
support of the European Union’s High
Representative, to a negotiated solution, the
Council encouraged Iran to engage with their
June 2006 proposals.
Following
adoption of the resolution, the United
Kingdom’s representative, reading out a
statement also on behalf of China, France,
Germany, Russian Federation and United States,
affirmed that the proposals presented in 2006
“remained on the table” and included
cooperation with Iran on civil nuclear energy,
legally binding guarantees on the supply of
nuclear fuel and wider political security and
economic cooperation. In that spirit, he
proposed further talks with Iran to see if a
mutually acceptable way could be found to open
negotiations, affirming his commitment to a
negotiated solution that would address the
international community’s concerns. He,
meanwhile, deplored Iran’s failure to comply
with the earlier resolutions of the Council and
IAEA, and called again on Iran to fully comply
with its obligations.
Iran’s
rejection of the 2006 offer, the United States
speaker said, had sent a “deeply troubling
signal” to the international community.
Nonetheless, the United States, too, was ready
to resolve the issue through negotiations.
The Iranian leadership’s claim that the
Council sought to deprive Iran of its right to
peaceful nuclear energy, he said, was simply not
true. Many other Governments around the
world, including some represented on the
Council, enjoyed national civilian nuclear
energy programmes without any difficulties,
demonstrating that there was no incompatibility
between a country’s right to a peaceful
nuclear-energy programme and its
non-proliferation obligations. The
unanimous passage of today’s resolution had
sent a clear and unambiguous message to Iran
that the regime’s continued pursuit of a
nuclear-weapon capability, in violation of its
treaty obligations, as well as its obligations
as a United Nations Member State, would only
further isolate Iran and make it less, not more,
secure.
China’s
representative said the purpose of the new
resolution was not to punish Iran, but to urge
Iran to return to the negotiations and
reactivate diplomatic efforts. The
relevant sanction measures should neither harm
the Iranian people nor affect normal economic,
trade and financial exchanges between Iran and
other countries. The Council’s actions
should be appropriate, incremental and
proportionate, and not aggravate conflict or
lead to confrontation. Resolution 1747, he
added, did not introduce any change to the
exemption provisions provided for in resolution
1737. If Iran suspended its
enrichment-related and reprocessing activities,
and complied with the relevant resolutions of
IAEA and the Council, the Council should suspend
and even terminate the sanction measures.
Iran’s
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Manouchehr Mottaki,
said that the Security Council was “being
abused to take an unlawful, unnecessary and
unjustifiable action against the peaceful
nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of
Iran, which presents no threat to international
peace and security and falls, therefore, outside
the Council’s Charter-based mandate”.
Pressure and intimidation would not change
Iranian policy. If certain countries had
pinned their hopes that repeated resolutions
would “dent the resolve of the great Iranian
nation”, they should have no doubt that they
had “once again faced catastrophic
intelligence and analytical failure vis-à-vis
the Iranian people’s Islamic revolution”.
Even the harshest political and economic
sanctions were too weak to coerce the Iranian
nation to retreat from their legal and
legitimate demands.
“
Iran’s nuclear programme is completely
peaceful,” he asserted. Iran had taken
unprecedented steps and offered several serious
proposals to allay any possible concern in that
regard. There had been no doubt, from the
beginning, nor should there be any for the
Council, that all those “schemes of the
co-sponsors of the resolution are for narrow
national considerations and aimed at depriving
the Iranian people of their inalienable rights,
rather than emanating from any so-called
proliferation concerns”. In order to
give that scheme a semblance of international
legitimacy, its initiators had first manipulated
the IAEA Board of Governors to vote against
Iran. Then, they had taken advantage of
their substantial economic and political power
to pressure and manipulate the Security Council
to adopt three unwarranted resolutions within
eight months. He invited the concerned
parties to “come back to the path of
negotiation based on justice and truth”.
Also
speaking today were the representatives of
Qatar, Congo, Indonesia, South Africa, France,
Russian Federation, Panama, Slovakia, Belgium
and Ghana.
The
meeting began at 3:16 p.m. and adjourned at 5:15
p.m.
Background
The
Security Council met today to take action on the
draft resolution contained in document
S/2007/170, sponsored by France, Germany and the
United Kingdom. The text reads as follows:
“The
Security Council,
“Recalling
the Statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15,
of 29 March 2006, and its resolution 1696 (2006)
of 31 July 2006, and its resolution 1737 (2006)
of 23 December 2006, and reaffirming
their provisions,
“Reaffirming
its commitment to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the need
for all States party to that Treaty to comply
fully with all their obligations, and recalling
the right of States parties, in conformity with
articles I and II of that Treaty, to develop
research, production and use of nuclear energy
for peaceful purposes without discrimination,
“Recalling
its serious concern over the reports of the IAEA
Director General as set out in its resolutions
1696 (2006) and 1737 (2006),
“Recalling
the latest report by the IAEA Director General
(GOV/2007/8) of 22 February 2007 and deploring
that, as indicated therein, Iran has failed to
comply with resolution 1696 (2006) and
resolution 1737 (2006),
“Emphasizing
the importance of political and diplomatic
efforts to find a negotiated solution
guaranteeing that Iran’s nuclear programme is
exclusively for peaceful purposes, and noting
that such a solution would benefit nuclear
non-proliferation elsewhere, and welcoming
the continuing commitment of China, France,
Germany, the Russian Federation, the United
Kingdom and the United States, with the support
of the European Union’s High Representative,
to seek a negotiated solution,
“Recalling
the resolution of the IAEA Board of
Governors (GOV/2006/14), which states that a
solution to the Iranian nuclear issue would
contribute to global non-proliferation efforts
and to realizing the objective of a Middle East
free of weapons of mass destruction, including
their means of delivery,
“Determined
to give effect to its decisions by adopting
appropriate measures to persuade Iran to comply
with resolution 1696 (2006) and resolution 1737
(2006) and with the requirements of the IAEA,
and also to constrain Iran’s development of
sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear
and missile programmes, until such time as the
Security Council determines that the objectives
of these resolutions have been met,
“Recalling
the requirement on States to join in affording
mutual assistance in carrying out the measures
decided upon by the Security Council,
“Concerned
by the proliferation risks presented by the
Iranian nuclear programme and, in this context,
by Iran’s continuing failure to meet the
requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors and
to comply with the provisions of Security
Council resolutions 1696 (2006) and 1737 (2006),
mindful of its primary responsibility
under the Charter of the United Nations for the
maintenance of international peace and security,
“Acting
under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter
of the United Nations,
“1.
Reaffirms that Iran shall without further
delay take the steps required by the IAEA Board
of Governors in its resolution GOV/2006/14,
which are essential to build confidence in the
exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear
programme and to resolve outstanding questions
and, in this context, affirms its
decision that Iran shall without further delay
take the steps required in paragraph 2 of
resolution 1737 (2006);
“2.
Calls upon all States also to exercise
vigilance and restraint regarding the entry into
or transit through their territories of
individuals who are engaged in, directly
associated with or providing support for
Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear
activities or for the development of nuclear
weapon delivery systems, and decides in
this regard that all States shall notify the
Committee established pursuant to paragraph 18
of resolution 1737 (2006) (herein “the
Committee”) of the entry into or transit
through their territories of the persons
designated in the Annex to resolution 1737
(2006) or Annex I to this resolution, as well as
of additional persons designated by the Security
Council or the Committee as being engaged in,
directly associated with or providing support
for Iran’s proliferation
sensitive nuclear activities or for the
development of nuclear weapon delivery systems,
including through the involvement in procurement
of the prohibited items, goods, equipment,
materials and technology specified by and under
the measures in paragraphs 3 and 4 of resolution
1737 (2006), except where such travel is for
activities directly related to the items in
subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) of that
resolution;
“3.
Underlines that nothing in the above
paragraph requires a State to refuse its own
nationals entry into its territory, and that all
States shall, in the implementation of the above
paragraph, take into account humanitarian
considerations, including religious obligations,
as well as the necessity to meet the objectives
of this resolution and resolution 1737 (2006),
including where article XV of the IAEA Statute
is engaged;
“4.
Decides that the measures specified in
paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of resolution 1737
(2006) shall apply also to the persons and
entities listed in Annex I to this resolution;
“5.
Decides that Iran shall not supply, sell
or transfer directly or indirectly from its
territory or by its nationals or using its flag
vessels or aircraft any arms or related
materiel, and that all States shall prohibit the
procurement of such items from Iran by their
nationals, or using their flag vessels or
aircraft, and whether or not originating in the
territory of Iran;
“6.
Calls upon all States to exercise
vigilance and restraint in the supply, sale or
transfer directly or indirectly from their
territories or by their nationals or using their
flag vessels or aircraft of any battle tanks,
armoured combat vehicles, large calibre
artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack
helicopters, warships, missiles or missile
systems as defined for the purpose of the United
Nations Register on Conventional Arms to Iran,
and in the provision to Iran of any technical
assistance or training, financial assistance,
investment, brokering or other services, and the
transfer of financial resources or services,
related to the supply, sale, transfer,
manufacture or use of such items in order to
prevent a destabilising accumulation of arms;
“7.
Calls upon all States and international
financial institutions not to enter into new
commitments for grants, financial assistance,
and concessional loans, to the government of the
Islamic Republic of Iran, except for
humanitarian and developmental purposes;
“8.
Calls upon all States to report to the
Committee within 60 days of the adoption of this
resolution on the steps they have taken with a
view to implementing effectively paragraphs 2,
4, 5, 6 and 7 above;
“9.
Expresses the conviction that the
suspension set out in paragraph 2 of resolution
1737 (2006), as well as full, verified Iranian
compliance with the requirements set out by the
IAEA Board of Governors would contribute to a
diplomatic, negotiated solution that guarantees
Iran’s nuclear programme is for exclusively
peaceful purposes, underlines the
willingness of the international community to
work positively for such a solution, encourages
Iran, in conforming to the above provisions, to
re-engage with the international community and
with the IAEA, and stresses that such
engagement will be beneficial to Iran;
“10.
Welcomes the continuous affirmation of
the commitment of China, France, Germany, the
Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the
United States, with the support of the European
Union’s High Representative, to a negotiated
solution to this issue and encourages
Iran to engage with their June 2006 proposals
(S/2006/521), attached in Annex II to this
resolution, which were endorsed by the Security
Council in resolution 1696 (2006), and acknowledges
with appreciation that this offer to Iran
remains on the table, for a long-term
comprehensive agreement which would allow for
the development of relations and cooperation
with Iran based on mutual respect and the
establishment of international confidence in the
exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear
programme;
“11.
Reiterates its determination to reinforce
the authority of the IAEA, strongly supports the
role of the IAEA Board of Governors, commends
and encourages the Director General of the
IAEA and its secretariat for their ongoing
professional and impartial efforts to resolve
all outstanding issues in Iran within the
framework of the IAEA, underlines the
necessity of the IAEA, which is internationally
recognized as having authority for verifying
compliance with safeguards agreements, including
the non-diversion of nuclear material for
non-peaceful purposes, in accordance with its
Statute, to continue its work to clarify all
outstanding issues relating to Iran’s nuclear
programme;
“12.
Requests within 60 days a further report
from the Director General of the IAEA on whether
Iran has established full and sustained
suspension of all activities mentioned in
resolution 1737 (2006), as well as on the
process of Iranian compliance with all the steps
required by the IAEA Board and with the other
provisions of resolution 1737 (2006) and of this
resolution, to the IAEA Board of Governors and
in parallel to the Security Council for its
consideration;
“13.
Affirms that it shall review Iran’s
actions in light of the report referred to in
paragraph 12 above, to be submitted within 60
days, and:
(a)
that it shall suspend the implementation of
measures if and for so long as Iran suspends all
enrichment-related and reprocessing activities,
including research and development, as verified
by the IAEA, to allow for negotiations in good
faith in order to reach an early and mutually
acceptable outcome;
(b)
that it shall terminate the measures specified
in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 12 of resolution
1737 (2006) as well as in paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6
and 7 above as soon as it determines, following
receipt of the report referred to in paragraph
12 above, that Iran has fully complied with its
obligations under the relevant resolutions of
the Security Council and met the requirements of
the IAEA Board of Governors, as confirmed by the
IAEA Board;
(c)
that it shall, in the event that the report in
paragraph 12 above shows that Iran has not
complied with resolution 1737 (2006) and this
resolution, adopt further appropriate measures
under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter
of the United Nations to persuade Iran to comply
with these resolutions and the requirements of
the IAEA, and underlines that further decisions
will be required should such additional measures
be necessary;
“14.
Decides to remain seized of the
matter.”
Resolution
Annex I
Entities
involved in nuclear or ballistic missile
activities
1.
Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG)
(aka Ammunition Industries Group) (AMIG controls
7th of Tir, which is designated under resolution
1737 (2006) for its role in Iran’s centrifuge
programme. AMIG is in turn owned and controlled
by the Defence Industries Organisation (DIO),
which is designated under resolution 1737
(2006))
2.
Esfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and Production
Centre (NFRPC) and Esfahan Nuclear Technology
Centre (ENTC) (Parts of the Atomic Energy
Organisation of Iran’s (AEOI) Nuclear Fuel
Production and Procurement Company, which is
involved in enrichment-related activities. AEOI
is designated under resolution 1737 (2006))
3.
Kavoshyar Company (Subsidiary company of AEOI,
which has sought glass fibres, vacuum chamber
furnaces and laboratory equipment for Iran’s
nuclear programme)
4.
Parchin Chemical Industries (Branch of DIO,
which produces ammunition, explosives, as well
as solid propellants for rockets and missiles)
5.
Karaj Nuclear Research Centre(Part of AEOI’s
research division)
6.
Novin Energy Company (aka Pars Novin) (Operates
within AEOI and has transferred funds on behalf
of AEOI to entities associated with Iran’s
nuclear programme)
7.
Cruise Missile Industry Group (aka Naval Defence
Missile Industry Group) (Production and
development of cruise missiles. Responsible for
naval missiles including cruise missiles)
8.
Bank Sepah and Bank Sepah International (Bank
Sepah provides support for the Aerospace
Industries Organisation (AIO) and subordinates,
including Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG)
and Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG), both
of which were designated under resolution 1737
(2006)
9.
Sanam Industrial Group (subordinate to AIO,
which has purchased equipment on AIO’s behalf
for the missile programme)
10.
Ya Mahdi Industries Group (subordinate to AIO,
which is involved in international purchases of
missile equipment)
Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Corps entities
1.
Qods Aeronautics Industries (Produces unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs), parachutes, paragliders,
paramotors, etc. Iranian Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC) has boasted of using these
products as part of its asymmetric warfare
doctrine)
2.
Pars Aviation Services Company (Maintains
various aircraft including MI-171, used by IRGC
Air Force)
3.
Sho’a’ Aviation (Produces micro-lights which
IRGC has claimed it is using as part of its
asymmetric warfare doctrine)
Persons
involved in nuclear or ballistic missile
activities
1.
Fereidoun Abbasi-Davani (Senior Ministry of
Defence and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL)
scientist with links to the Institute of Applied
Physics, working closely with Mohsen
Fakhrizadeh-Mahabadi, designated below)
2.
Mohsen Fakhrizadeh-Mahabadi (Senior MODAFL
scientist and former head of the Physics
Research Centre (PHRC). The IAEA have asked to
interview him about the activities of the PHRC
over the period he was head but Iran has
refused)
3.
Seyed Jaber Safdari (Manager of the Natanz
Enrichment Facilities)
4.
Amir Rahimi (Head of Esfahan Nuclear Fuel
Research and Production Centre, which is part of
the AEOI’s Nuclear Fuel Production and
Procurement Company, which is involved in
enrichment-related activities)
5.
Mohsen Hojati (Head of Fajr Industrial Group,
which is designated under resolution 1737 (2006)
for its role in the ballistic missile programme)
6.
Mehrdada Akhlaghi Ketabachi (Head of SBIG, which
is designated under resolution 1737 (2006) for
its role in the ballistic missile programme)
7.
Naser Maleki (Head of SHIG, which is designated
under resolution 1737 (2006) for its role in
Iran’s ballistic missile programme. Naser
Maleki is also a MODAFL official overseeing work
on the Shahab-3 ballistic missile programme.
The Shahab-3 is Iran’s long range
ballistic missile currently in service)
8.
Ahmad Derakhshandeh (Chairman and Managing
Director of Bank Sepah, which provides support
for the AIO and subordinates, including SHIG and
SBIG, both of which were designated under
resolution 1737 (2006))
Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Corps key persons
1.
Brigadier General Morteza Rezaie (Deputy
Commander of IRGC)
2.
Vice Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian (Chief of IRGC
Joint Staff.)
3.
Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Zahedi
(Commander of IRGC Ground Forces)
4.
Rear Admiral Morteza Safari (Commander of IRGC
Navy)
5.
Brigadier General Mohammad Hejazi (Commander of
Bassij resistance force)
6.
Brigadier General Qasem Soleimani (Commander of
Qods force)
7.
General Zolqadr (IRGC officer, Deputy Interior
Minister for Security Affairs)
Resolution
Annex II
Elements
of a long-term agreement
Our
goal is to develop relations and cooperation
with Iran, based on mutual respect and the
establishment of international confidence in the
exclusively peaceful nature of the nuclear
programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran. We
propose a fresh start in the negotiation of a
comprehensive agreement with Iran. Such an
agreement would be deposited with the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and
endorsed in a Security Council resolution.
To
create the right conditions for negotiations,
We
will:
•
Reaffirm Iran’s right to develop nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with
its obligations under the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(hereinafter, NPT), and in this context reaffirm
our support for the development by Iran of a
civil nuclear energy programme.
•
Commit to support actively the building of new
light water reactors in Iran through
international joint projects, in accordance with
the IAEA statute and NPT.
•
Agree to suspend discussion of Iran’s nuclear
programme in the Security Council upon the
resumption of negotiations.
Iran
will:
•
Commit to addressing all of the outstanding
concerns of IAEA through full cooperation with
IAEA,
•
Suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing
activities to be verified by IAEA, as requested
by the IAEA Board of Governors and the Security
Council, and commit to continue this during
these negotiations.
•
Resume the implementation of the Additional
Protocol.
Areas
of future cooperation to be covered in
negotiations on a long-term agreement
1.
Nuclear
We
will take the following steps:
Iran
’s rights to nuclear energy
•
Reaffirm Iran’s inalienable right to nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes without
discrimination and in conformity with articles I
and II of NPT, and cooperate with Iran in the
development by Iran of a civil nuclear power
programme.
•
Negotiate and implement a Euratom/Iran nuclear
cooperation agreement.
Light
water reactors
•
Actively support the building of new light water
power reactors in Iran through international
joint projects, in accordance with the IAEA
statute and NPT, using state-of-the-art
technology, including by authorizing the
transfer of necessary goods and the provision of
advanced technology to make its power reactors
safe against earthquakes.
•
Provide cooperation with the management of spent
nuclear fuel and radioactive waste through
appropriate arrangements.
Research
and development in nuclear energy
•
Provide a substantive package of research and
development cooperation, including possible
provision of light water research reactors,
notably in the fields of radioisotope
production, basic research and nuclear
applications in medicine and agriculture.
Fuel
guarantees
•
Give legally binding, multilayered fuel
assurances to Iran, based on:
◦
Participation as a partner in an international
facility in Russia to provide enrichment
services for a reliable supply of fuel to
Iran’s nuclear reactors. Subject to
negotiations, such a facility could enrich all
uranium hexaflouride (UF6) produced
in Iran.
◦
Establishment on commercial terms of a buffer
stock to hold a reserve of up to five years’
supply of nuclear fuel dedicated to Iran, with
the participation and under supervision of IAEA.
◦
Development with IAEA of a standing multilateral
mechanism for reliable access to nuclear fuel,
based on ideas to be considered at the next
meeting of the Board of Governors.
Review
of moratorium
The
long-term agreement would, with regard to common
efforts to build international confidence,
contain a clause for review of the agreement in
all its aspects, to follow:
•
Confirmation by IAEA that all outstanding issues
and concerns reported by it, including those
activities which could have a military nuclear
dimension, have been resolved;
•
Confirmation that there are no undeclared
nuclear activities or materials in Iran and that
international confidence in the exclusively
peaceful nature of Iran’s civil nuclear
programme has been restored.
2.
Political and economic
Regional
security cooperation
Support
for a new conference to promote dialogue and
cooperation on regional security issues.
International
trade and investment
Improving
Iran’s access to the international economy,
markets and capital, through practical support
for full integration into international
structures, including the World Trade
Organization and to create the framework for
increased direct investment in Iran and trade
with Iran (including a trade and economic
cooperation agreement with the European Union).
Steps would be taken to improve access to
key goods and technology.
Civil
aviation
Civil
aviation cooperation, including the possible
removal of restrictions on United States and
European manufacturers in regard to the export
of civil aircraft to Iran, thereby widening the
prospect of Iran renewing its fleet of civil
airliners.
Energy
partnership
Establishment
of a long-term energy partnership between Iran
and the European Union and other willing
partners, with concrete and practical
applications.
Telecommunications
infrastructure
Support
for the modernization of Iran’s
telecommunication infrastructure and advanced
Internet provision, including by possible
removal of relevant United States and other
export restrictions.
High
technology cooperation
Cooperation
in fields of high technology and other areas to
be agreed upon.
Agriculture
Support
for agricultural development in Iran, including
possible access to United States and European
agricultural products, technology and farm
equipment.
Statements
before the Vote
Speaking
in explanation of position before the vote,
NASSIR ABDULAZIZ AL-NASSER ( Qatar) said
Iran had the right to nuclear energy research
and production for peaceful purposes. That
was Iran’s inalienable right according to
articles I and II of the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which
nobody could deny. He did not doubt the
genuine intentions of Iran’s peaceful nuclear
programme. He was saddened that the
Council was forced to impose new sanctions on
Iran. He did not see sanctions as an
appropriate means of pressure, as it might
complicate matters and signified another failure
of diplomatic efforts. Continued pressure
did not help to build confidence, which was
already lost between the two parties. On
the contrary, it might sometimes have serious
consequences, given the already volatile
situation in the region.
The
dead end in the negotiations between the
concerned countries and Iran made it necessary
to seek new prospects and explore all possible
means that paved the way to reach a peaceful
solution to the impasse by diplomatic means.
Qatar was keen on adherence by all States to the
Non-Proliferation Treaty. That was a solid
principle from which no country could deviate.
When voting against resolution 1696 (2006),
Qatar had been very clear that it was not
expressing an opinion opposed to that principle,
but was in favour of allowing Iran more time to
study the offer by the six countries. He
looked forward to seeing specific proposals from
both parties that contributed to revitalizing
the prospects of diplomatic solutions.
Addressing
non-proliferation issues should not be done
through selectivity, he said. He did not
see the Council dealing with those issues with
different criteria. The Council was
required to follow the same approach towards
countries that did not comply with their
obligations according to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty and towards those that did not pay
attention to it in the first place. That
was why Qatar had presented a clear and direct
proposal in the draft resolution regarding the
establishment in the Middle East of a zone free
of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery.
He regretted that the sponsors of the draft had
not taken that proposal on board.
PASCAL
GAYAMA ( Congo) said he had, from the
beginning of his term on the Security Council,
understood the need for unity in order to endow
the message it sent and give it more coherence.
His delegation had participated in the
negotiations preceding today’s vote. It
was a particularly important decision. For
Congo, the most important aspect was to ensure
compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty,
based on the three pillars, which must all be
observed; namely: non-proliferation; nuclear
disarmament; and the inalienable right of all
States parties to nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes. Here, the main problem was the
lack of trust in the peaceful character of
Iran’s nuclear programme.
He
said that, according to the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran had been outside the
scope of control for some 20 years. He
sought a solution based on dialogue and
negotiation, and without any threat or use of
force. Today’s vote should not be
interpreted as hostile or punitive. Congo
would like to give a signal through the vote of
the steps that needed to be taken, such as
suspension of Iran’s uranium enrichment.
That would not be a sign of weakness by Iran.
His country anticipated continuing its peaceful
relations with Iran.
REZLAN
ISHAR JENIE ( Indonesia) said that the
purpose of the draft was not to punish the
people or Government of Iran, but to enforce
compliance with previous Council resolutions and
resolve outstanding IAEA resolutions. The
draft was not final or irrevocable, but a
reversible one. It rested on two related
conditions: Iran taking action to suspend its
proliferation-sensitive nuclear activity, to be
verified by IAEA, which would then set a stage
for negotiations towards an early and mutually
acceptable outcome. It was also of great
significance that measures specified in
resolution 1737 (2006) would also be terminated
following the determination that Iran had
complied with its obligations. Should Iran
feel it was necessary to move towards a
negotiated solution, today’s text provided an
opportunity for that, in accordance with the
proposal made in June 2006, which was “still
on the table”. He enjoined the
Government of Iran to “keep that door open”,
because through it was a comprehensive agreement
on the exclusive peaceful nature of Iran’s
nuclear programme.
He
said that today’s draft had accommodated some
of his Government’s concerns, and several of
its amendments had been taken on board.
Those had included the reference to a Middle
East free of weapons of mass destruction.
Indonesia was concerned about the problem of
proliferation in general and, particularly, in
the region. The establishment of zones
free of nuclear and other weapons of mass
destruction was a critical measure towards
strengthening global nuclear disarmament and
non-proliferation. The creation of such
zones, including in the Middle East, would
contribute to strengthening global peace and
security. There was a need for all States
parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to
comply fully with all obligations; all three
pillars must be pursued in a balanced and
non-discriminatory manner.
Not
only should the non-proliferation obligations of
the non-nuclear-weapon States be emphasized, but
also the nuclear disarmament obligations of the
nuclear-weapon States under the Treaty’s
article VI, he stressed. The only way to
eliminate the fear caused by the possible use or
threat of use of nuclear weapons was their total
elimination. The solution to the issue of
Iran should in no way affect or change the
inalienable right of all Non-Proliferation
Treaty parties, including Iran, to develop,
research, produce and use nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes without discrimination, in
accordance with the Treaty.
Council
President DUMISANI S. KUMALO (South Africa),
speaking in his national capacity, said that the
resolution, although far from ideal, was a
consequence of concern about the need to build
international confidence in Iran’s nuclear
programme. South Africa had approached the
text on its merits, and with a perspective of
the country that was not a party to any dispute
or conflict. The Council was well aware
that South Africa was fully committed to the
elimination of all weapons of mass destruction
and, therefore, was a strong advocate against
both the horizontal and vertical proliferation
of nuclear weapons. Inevitably, it was
against the development of nuclear weapons by
Iran, or by any other country. Its
position had been informed by its own national
experience, as the only country to have
voluntarily dismantled its nuclear weapons and
related programmes.
He
said that, while South Africa recognized that
the Security Council might be called upon to
impose coercive measures, such as sanctions, it
believed that those measures should be utilized
with great caution, and only to support the
resumption of political dialogue and
negotiations to achieve a peaceful solution.
South Africa’s interventions in the Council,
therefore, had focused on trying to deescalate
tensions, promote dialogue to establish
confidence in Iran’s nuclear programme, ensure
that the IAEA inspectors remained on the ground
in Iran and that Iran remained part of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
South
Africa had always been very clear, as a matter
of principle, that the Council must remain
within its mandate of addressing threats to
international peace and security, he said.
If the co-sponsors of the resolution were
convinced that the Iranian programme was a
threat to international peace, then the Council
should have been asked to take a decision on a
draft that had concentrated on that, and not act
as if the Iranian Government itself posed a
threat to international peace and security.
He
said he had proposed a number of constructive
amendments to the draft resolution. The
purpose had been to assist the Council in
finding language for a new text that matched the
stated objectives of the co-sponsors, so that
the resolution would be “proportionate,
incremental and reversible”. While he
remained “deeply disappointed” that not all
of his proposals had been accommodated, the
resolution, however, correctly acknowledged that
there was a need to respect the right of all
countries, including Iran, to exploit the
peaceful uses of nuclear technology, subject to
appropriate safeguards. He had been
particularly pleased with the fact that the
resolution now reaffirmed the need for all
States parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty to comply fully with all their
obligations, which corresponded with his view
that the twin obligations of nuclear disarmament
and nuclear non-proliferation required equal
attention. “After all, there is no basis
for arguing that mass-destruction weapons are
safe in some hands and not in others,” he
said.
Noting
that IAEA had been able to verify the
non-diversion of declared nuclear material in
Iran, he said, however, that he shared the
Director General’s concern that the Agency
continued to be unable “to reconstruct fully
the history of Iran’s nuclear programme and
some of its components”, because the necessary
level of transparency and cooperation had not
been provided by Iran.
He
said that the 15 Council members had taken a
difficult decision and, after today’s vote, a
great deal of work still lay ahead, if the
international community hoped to prevent
heightened tensions from spiralling out of
control. A path needed to be urgently
found back to negotiations, restraint and
composure on all sides. South Africa,
therefore, hoped that the latest offer by Iran
to resume negotiations would lead to concrete
results.
He
urged Iran to provide the necessary assistance
and cooperation to IAEA; it was imperative that
confidence was established in Iran’s nuclear
programme for peaceful purposes. Every
effort must be made to resume dialogue and enter
into meaningful negotiations to find a
sustainable long-term solution to the matter,
since no one would win through a process of
confrontation that could lead to disastrous
consequences in a highly volatile region.
Resuming
his role as Council President, Mr. KUMALO put
the draft resolution to a vote. It was
adopted unanimously as resolution 1747 (2007).
Statements
after the Vote
EMYR
JONES PARRY (United Kingdom), reading out
the text of a statement that had been agreed
upon by the foreign ministers of China, France,
Germany, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and
United States, with the support of the High
Representative of the European Union, said the
unanimous adoption of resolution 1747 (2007)
reflected the international community’s
profound concerns over Iran’s nuclear
programme. He deplored Iran’s failure to
comply with the earlier resolutions of the
Council and IAEA, and called upon Iran, once
again, to comply fully with all its
international obligations. He was
committed to seeking a negotiated solution that
would address the international community’s
concerns. The purpose of negotiations
would be to reach a comprehensive agreement with
Iran, based on mutual respect, that would
re-establish international confidence in the
exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear
programme and open the way to improving
relations and developing wider cooperation
between Iran and China, France, Germany, Russian
Federation, United Kingdom and United States.
He
recognized Iran’s rights under the
Non-Proliferation Treaty to develop research,
production and use of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes in conformity with its Treaty
obligations. In that respect, future
arrangements, modalities and timing would be
dealt with in negotiations. Full
transparency and cooperation by Iran with IAEA
was essential, in order to address outstanding
concerns. The countries reiterated full
support for IAEA and stood by their
“suspension for suspension” proposal.
That meant for the duration of negotiations,
which would take place within an agreed time
frame, extendable by mutual agreement, Iran
would maintain an IAEA-verified suspension, as
required by Council resolutions 1737 and 1747,
and Council discussion of Iran’s nuclear
programme would also be suspended, as would the
implementation of measures under the relevant
Council resolutions.
He
reconfirmed the proposals presented to Iran in
2006, including cooperation with Iran on civil
nuclear energy, legally binding guarantees on
the supply of nuclear fuel and wider political
security and economic cooperation. Those
proposals remained on the table. Urging
Iran to take the opportunity to engage and to
find a negotiated way forward, he said the
proposals would bring far-reaching benefits to
Iran and to the region, and they provided a
means to address the international community’s
concerns, while taking account of Iran’s
legitimate interests. In a region that had
known too much instability and violence, it was
necessary to find an agreed way forward that
built confidence and promoted peace and mutual
respect. In that spirit, he proposed
further talks with Iran to see if a mutually
acceptable way could be found to open
negotiations.
Speaking
in his national capacity, he said it was just
short of a year since the Council had first
taken action on the Iranian nuclear issue,
following IAEA’s referral of the issue to it.
The United Kingdom’s concern throughout had
been two-fold, namely to promote prospects for a
negotiated solution, on which suspension of
enrichment by Iran depended, and to reinforce
IAEA’s role. Those concerns had led to
the elaboration of a detailed offer of long-term
cooperation from the six nations whose statement
he had just read. Those ministers,
however, had also agreed to seek further Council
action on Iran, should their demands not be met.
Iran’s
continuing defiance had prompted the adoption of
resolution 1696 of July 2006, setting the
framework of the Council’s actions, including
a binding Chapter VII decision that Iran should
suspend its enrichment-related and reprocessing
activities. Despite that, Iran had ignored
the Council, leading in turn to further Council
action. On 23 December, the Council had
unanimously adopted resolution 1737, reaffirming
the mandatory requirement for Iran to suspend
its enrichment-related and reprocessing
activities, and clarifying that Iran must also
suspend construction of the heavy-water research
reactor at Arak. It had also introduced a
number of measures aimed at restricting Iranian
development of sensitive nuclear technologies
and its development of ballistic missiles that
could deliver them.
He
said the measures were an incremental and
proportionate response to Iran’s failure to
comply with the requirements of resolution 1696,
aimed at persuading Iran that its interests were
best served by putting in place the conditions
necessary for discussions to seek a negotiated
resolution to the issue. As requested by
resolution 1737, IAEA Director General Mohamed
ElBaradei had reported on 22 February that Iran
had continued to pursue those sensitive
technologies, in defiance of its obligations
under international law. That was the
backdrop to the intensive and constructive
deliberations that had led to the resolution
today. By adopting the resolution, the
Council had continued its incremental and
proportionate approach, increasing gradually the
pressure on Iran to address the concerns shared
across the international community.
Continuing,
he said the Council had strengthened the
restrictions on individuals closely associated
with Iran’s sensitive nuclear activities and
with its ballistic missile programme, prohibited
arms sales from Iran and had urged vigilance
over the supply of heavy weapons to Iran.
The Council had also urged restraint in making
finance available to Iran’s Government.
The new resolution did not introduce any changes
to the provisions in paragraph 15 of resolution
1737. The assets freeze, therefore, did
not prevent a person or entity designated in the
annexes to resolution 1737 and the current
resolution from making payment due under a
contract entered into force before that person
or entity had been listed in cases covered by
paragraph 15.
Building
on resolutions 1696 and 1737, resolution 1747
sent a unanimous and unambiguous signal to the
Government and people of Iran, he concluded.
“To both we say that we prefer, and are
committed to, the path of cooperation. But
we say also that the path of proliferation by
Iran is not one that the international community
can accept,” he said. The United Kingdom
wanted Iran to make the right choice, namely
cooperation with the international community,
which required the removal of any doubt that
Iran could develop nuclear weapons. The
Council’s resolve was clear. Iran must
make its choice.
JEAN-MARC
DE LA SABLIÈRE ( France) welcomed the
Council’s unanimous adoption of the
resolution. Iran had failed to suspend its
enrichment and reprocessing activities. It
had also not suspended its heavy-water
activities, including the construction of a
heavy-water reactor at Arak, nor had it resumed
cooperation with IAEA under the Optional
Protocol. Thus, Iran had ignored IAEA’s
Board of Governor’s resolutions and the
Council’s demands in resolutions 1696 and
1737. As affirmed in resolution 1737,
those measures were essential to restore
confidence. The international community
was concerned by the proliferation questions
that arose from the Iranian nuclear programme.
After several years, IAEA was unable to provide
the international community with the safeguard
it required as to the strictly peaceful nature
of the programme. Essential questions,
including ones with possible military
implications, remained unanswered.
He
added that nobody in the Council wished to deny
Iran its right to, or prevent the Iranian people
from benefiting from, nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes. All States parties to
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty had the
right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, as
long as they met the obligations under articles
I and II of the Treaty. The international
community asked Iran to fulfil those
non-proliferation obligations. It was
unacceptable that Iranian officials shirked
their obligations under the Treaty. By
adopting resolution 1737, the Council had
indicated that it would suspend sanctions if
Iran were to return to complete suspension of
all enrichment and reprocessing activities.
The Council also warned that it would take
further measures should Iran persist in not
meeting the international community’s demands.
The last IAEA report showed that Iran’s
leaders had not made the choice the
international community had hoped it would make.
The Council had to act in those conditions.
The
measures adopted today were in proportion to
Iran’s actions and were reversible, he said.
They were also in line with the approach of
constant pressure applied by the Council to
persuade Iran to return to the conditions
necessary for negotiation and restrict the
development of the sensitive programmes
undertaken. The additional measures
adopted concerned a series of entities and
individuals involved in Iran’s proliferation
programmes. It also concerned entities and
individuals linked to Iran’s Revolutionary
Guard, who played a worrying role in Iran’s
development of sensitive nuclear activities, and
addressed also the Sepah Bank, which had been
linked to funding activities for Iran’s
nuclear programme. The measures outlined
by the resolution had been defined to exert
effective pressure on Iranian authorities, while
seeking to spare the Iranian people as much as
possible. The resolution did not introduce
any change to the provisions of paragraph 15 of
resolution 1737.
Iran’s
choice, he said, was to meet the international
community’s demands or face growing isolation.
A further path was available, other than the one
on which Iran had embarked; namely a path of
negotiation in good faith and discussion on the
basis of the proposals submitted last June by
the party of six, which recognized Iran’s
inalienable rights to benefit from nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes and offered
cooperation to develop peaceful nuclear energy.
That offer remained on the table. France
and the group of six were earnest in their
desire to arrive at a negotiated solution.
He hoped the Iranian leaders would heed that
call.
ALEJANDRO
D. WOLFF ( United States) said his
country was pleased that the Council had once
again unanimously taken action against what was
“clearly a grave threat to international peace
and security”. The Iranian
leadership’s continued defiance of the Council
in failing to comply with resolutions 1696 and
1737 required that the Council uphold its
Charter-mandated responsibilities and take
action. While he hoped Iran responded to
today’s resolution by complying with its
international legal obligations, the United
States “is fully prepared to support
additional measures in 60 days, should Iran
choose another course”, he warned.
He
said the Council was meeting today because of
the decisions of Iran’s leadership.
Their actions included more than 20 years of
deception of IAEA; namely “a nuclear programme
hidden from the international community, in
violation of the NPT -- a programme that is
emerging from the shadows slowly and
incompletely, only
