"CONTAINING
RUSSIA: BACK TO THE FUTURE?" by RUSSIAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SERGEY LAVROV: 19/7/2007
Influential political forces
on both sides of the Atlantic appear intent on starting a debate about whether
or not to "contain" Russia. The mere posing of the question suggests
that for some almost nothing has changed since the Cold War.
What is a return to containment
meant to achieve at a time when Russia has abandoned ideology and imperial
aspirations in favor of pragmatism and common sense? What is the purpose of
containing a country that is successfully developing and thereby naturally
strengthening its international position? What is the point of containing a
country that aspires to things as basic as international trade?
It should be no surprise that
Russia today is making use of its natural competitive advantages. It is also
investing in its human resources, encouraging innovation, integrating into the
global economy, and modernizing its legislation. Russia wants international
stability to underpin its own development. Accordingly, it is working toward the
establishment of a freer and more democratic international order.
The new advocacy of containment
may stem from a substantial gap between Russian and U.S. aspirations. U.S.
diplomacy seeks to transform what Washington considers "nondemocratic"
govern-ments around the world, reordering entire regions in the process. Russia,
with its experience with revolution and extremism, cannot subscribe to any such
ideologically driven project, especially one that comes from abroad. The Cold
War represented a step away from the Westphalian standard of state sovereignty,
which placed values beyond the scope of intergovernmental relations. A return to
Cold War theories such as containment will only lead to confrontation.
In contrast to the Soviet Union,
Russia is an open country that does not erect walls, either physical or
political. On the contrary, Russia calls for the removal of visa barriers and
other artificial hurdles in international relations. It espouses democracy and
market economics as the right bases for social and political order and economic
life.
Although Russia has a long way to
go, it has chosen a path of development that entails unprecedented, and at times
painful, changes. Russian society has reached a broad consensus that these
changes should be evolutionary and free of upheavals. Ultimately, a mature
democracy, with a vibrant civil society and a well-structured party system, will
emerge from a higher level of social and economic development. This requires a
substantial middle class, which cannot come into being overnight. It was only
Russian tycoons who emerged overnight in the early 1990s – and those times are
definitely over.
Countries dependent on external
sources of energy criticize Russia for assuming its naturally large role in the
global energy sector. However, those countries should recognize that energy
dependence is reciprocal, since hoarding is not a wise choice for an energy
exporting country. That is why Russia has never failed to fulfill any of its
hydrocarbon-supply contracts with importing countries. Russia does, however,
consider energy to be a strategic sector that helps safeguard independence in
its foreign relations. This is understandable given the negative external
reactions to Russia's strengthened economy and enlarged role in international
affairs, in which Russia lawfully employs its newly gained freedom of action and
speech. It should not be criticized by those who frown on a stronger Russia.
The Russian government's energy
policy reflects a global trend toward state control over natural resources.
Ninety percent of the world's proven hydrocarbon reserves are under some form of
state control. Such state control of energy resources is offset, however, by the
concentration of cutting-edge technology in the hands of private transnational
corporations. Thus, there are incentives for cooperation between the parties,
with each sharing the same objective of meeting the energy requirements of the
world economy.
Russia is pursuing a foreign
policy in striking contrast to the ideologically motivated internationalism of
the Soviet Union. Today, Russia believes that multilateral diplomacy based on
international law should manage regional and global relations. As globalization
has extended beyond the West, competition has become truly global – nothing
less than a paradigm shift. Competing states must now take into account
differing values and development patterns. The challenge is to establish
fairness in this complex competitive environment.
The logical approach is for
countries to focus on their competitive advantages without imposing their values
on others. U.S. attempts to do the latter have weakened the West's competitive
position. As Eberhard Sandschneider, director of the Research Institute of the
German Society for Foreign Policy, has put it, U.S. policies in recent years
have "damaged tremendously the image of the West" in Asia and Africa.
He concludes that nothing, or almost nothing, has been done to make Western
values attractive to Asian and African populations. Russia can hardly be held
responsible for that.
In his speech in Munich earlier
this year, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated the obvious when he said that
a "unipolar world" had failed to materialize. Recent experience shows
as clearly as ever that no state or group of states possesses sufficient
resources to impose its will on the world. Hierarchy might seem attractive to
some in global affairs, but it is utterly unrealistic. It is one thing to
respect American culture and civilization; it is another to embrace Americo-centrism.
The new international system has
not one but several leading actors, and their collective leadership is needed to
manage global relations. This multipolarity encourages network diplomacy as the
best way for states to achieve shared objectives. In this system, the United
Nations becomes pivotal, providing through its charter the means for collective
discussion and action.
In the twenty-first century, delay
in solving accumulated problems carries devastating consequences for all
nations. One sure lesson is that unilateral responses, consisting primarily of
using force, result in stalemates and broken china everywhere. The current
catalog of unresolved crises – Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Darfur, North Korea – is
a testament to that. Genuine security will only be achieved through establishing
normal relations and engaging in dialogue. German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter
Steinmeier hit the right note when he counseled that today's world should be
based on cooperation rather than military deterrence.
Complex problems require
comprehensive approaches. In the case of Iran, resolving differences should lie
in the normalization by all countries of their relations with Tehran.
Normalization would also help preserve the nuclear nonproliferation regime.
Regarding Kosovo, independence from Serbia would create a precedent that goes
beyond the existing norms of international law. Our partners' inclination to
give way to the blackmail of violence and anarchy within Kosovo contrasts with
the indifference shown to similar violence and anarchy in the Palestinian
territories, where it has been tolerated for decades while a Palestinian state
has yet to be established.
Eliminating the Cold War legacy in
Europe, where the containment policy was dominant for too long, is especially
pressing. Creating division in Europe encourages nationalist sentiments that
threaten the unity of the continent. The current problems faced by the European
Union, in particular, and European politics, in general, cannot be solved
without Europe's maintaining constructive and future-oriented relations with
Russia – relations based on mutual trust and confidence. This ought to be seen
as serving U.S. interests as well.
Instead, various attempts are
being made to contain Russia, including through the eastward expansion of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization in violation of previous assurances given to
Moscow. Today, supporters of NATO enlargement harp on the organization's
supposed role in the promotion of democracy. How is democracy furthered by a
military-political alliance that is producing scenarios for the use of force?
Meanwhile, some are promoting the
extension of NATO membership to the countries that comprise the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as some sort of pass providing
admittance to the club of democratic states whether these countries meet the
democratic test or not. One cannot help wondering whether this initiative is
being pursued for the sake of moral satisfaction or again to contain Russia.
As far as the CIS is concerned,
Russia has the capacity to maintain social, economic, and other forms of
stability in the region. Moscow’s rejection of politicized trade and economic
relations and its adoption of market-based principles testifies to its
determination to have normalcy in interstate relations. Russia and the West can
cooperate in this region but only by forsaking zero-sum power games.
The drive to place missile
defenses in eastern Europe is evidence of the U.S. effort to contain Russia. It
is hardly coincidental that this installation would fit into the U.S. global
missile defense system that is deployed along Russia's perimeter. Many Europeans
are rightfully concerned that stationing elements of the U.S. missile defense
system in Europe would undermine disarmament processes. For its part, Russia
considers the initiative a strategic challenge that requires a strategic
response.
President Putin’s offer to allow
joint usage of the Gabala radar base in Azerbaijan, instead of those eastern
European installations – as well as his proposal, made when meeting with
President George W.Bush in Kennebunkport, Maine, in July, to create a regional
monitoring and early warning system – provides a brilliant opportunity to find
a way out of the present situation with the dignity of all parties intact. As a
starting point for a truly collective effort in this area, Russia is willing to
take part, together with the United States and others, in a joint analysis of
potential missile threats up to the year 2020.
The desire to contain Russia
clearly manifests itself as well in the situation surrounding the 1990 Treaty on
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (or CFE Treaty). Russia complies with
the treaty in good faith and insists only on the one thing that the treaty
promises: equal security. However, the equal security principle was compromised
with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact; meanwhile, NATO was left intact
and then enlarged. In the meantime, attempts to correct the situation have come
up against the refusal of NATO member countries to ratify the
modernization of the treaty under various unrelated pretexts that have no legal
justification and are entirely political. The lesson to be drawn from the CFE
Treaty stalemate is that any element of global or European security
architecture that is not based on the principles of equality and mutual benefit
will not prove to be sustainable. After all, if we cannot adapt this old
instrument to the new realities, is it not time to review the situation and
start developing a new system of arms control and confidence-building measures,
if we find that Europe needs one? Here again, frank discussion at Kennebunkport
gave hope that there is way to move toward putting into force the adapted
treaty.
It is time to bury the Cold War
legacy and establish structures that meet the imperatives of this era –
particularly since Russia and the West are no longer adversaries and do not wish
to create the impression that war is still a possibility in Europe. The path to
trust lies through candid dialogue and reasoned debate, as well as interactions
based on the joint analysis of threats. At the moment, however, without
reasonable grounds, Russia is excluded from such joint analysis. Instead, it is
urged to believe in the analytic abilities and good intentions of its partners.
Russians do not suffer from a
sense of exceptionalism, but neither do they consider their analytic abilities
and ideas inferior to those of others. Russia will respond to safeguard its
national security, and in doing so will be guided by the principle of
"reasonable sufficiency." Meanwhile, it will always keep the door open
for positive joint action to safeguard common interests on the basis of
equality. This is the only serious approach to national security concerns.
In his speech in Munich, President
Putin invited all of Russia’s partners to start a serious and substantive
discussion of the current status of international affairs, which is far from
satisfactory. Russia is convinced that a friend/enemy attitude toward it should
be a thing of the past. If efforts are being undertaken to "counter
Russia’s negative behavior," how can Russia be expected to cooperate in
areas of interest to its partners? One has to choose between containment and
cooperation. This is relevant to Russia's accession to the World Trade
Organization and the Asian Development Bank and to the unwarranted continuance
of the 1970s Jackson-Vanik amendment, which denies Russia permanent normal
trading relations with the United States.
U.S.-Russian relations still enjoy
the stabilizing benefits of a close and honest working relationship between
President Putin and President Bush. Both countries and both peoples share the
memory of their joint victory over fascism and their joint exit from the Cold
War, which unites them in its own right. Should equal partnership prevail in
U.S.-Russian relations, very little will be impossible for the two nations to
achieve. The challenges are many – the struggle against international
terrorism; organized crime and drug trafficking; the search for realistic
climate protection; the development of nuclear energy while strengthening
nonproliferation efforts; the pursuit of global energy security; and the
exploration of outer space. Practical cooperation on these and other challenges
should not be sacrificed on the altar of renewed containment.
At present, anti-Americanism is
not as widespread in Russia as it is elsewhere. But a return to containment, and
the bloc-based thinking that accompanies it, could trigger mutual alienation
between Americans and Russians. The strains evident in the U.S.-Russian
relationship call for a high-level working group charged with finding ways to
further cooperation. The presidents of Russia and the United States support the
idea of such a group, headed by the former statesmen Henry Kissinger and Yevgeny
Primakov.
Both sides should demonstrate a
broad-minded and unbiased vision, one that represents Russia and the United
States as two branches of European civilization. Russia, the United States, and
the European Union should work together to preserve the integrity of the
Euro-Atlantic space in global politics. For as Jacques Delors has said, whenever
this troika "is divided by differences, whenever each party plays its own
game, the risk of global instability greatly increases."
So why not stand together and act
in the spirit of cooperation and fair competition on the basis of shared
standards and a respect for international law? At the Kennebunkport meeting in
July, President Putin and President Bush demonstrated what teamwork can achieve.
They agreed to look for common approaches to missile defense and strategic arms
reductions, and they launched new initiatives on nuclear energy and
nonproliferation. Russia and the United States have nothing to divide them;
along with other partners, they share responsibility for the future of the
world. It is not Russia that needs to be contained; it is those who would
deprive the world of the benefits that will come from a strong U.S.-Russian
partnership.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~