UNITED NATIONS - 30 January 2006  / www.MaximsNews.com/

Available for Media Interviews: HansBlix@MaximsNews.com

           UNITED NATIONS - 30 January 2006  / www.MaximsNews.com/ For a while it looked as if Iran was genuinely interested in building and owning a plant for the enrichment of uranium in Russia. 

In such an arrangement, Russia would guarantee that the level of enrichment was not suddenly increased from around 4 %, which is needed for fuel in nuclear power reactors to some 90%, which can be used for warheads. 

Then came some amazingly aggressive statements by the new President of Iran, seals placed by the IAEA in some facilities were broken and “research” relating to enrichment was resumed. 

The world is now abuzz with speculations about hauling Iran before the UN Security Council, about economic and military actions, as well as about possible measures by Iran to terminate IAEA inspections and impacts on the price of oil. 

Is much of this part of an ongoing negotiation? 

In the case of North Korea, a country not only suspected of a clandestine enrichment program but assumed to already to possess nuclear weapons, negotiations take place outside the Security Council and without the threat of sanctions.  

It is almost a wasted effort to try to establish what aims Iran or different groups in Iran may have for the program to enrich uranium. 

While Iran might have some reason to seek self-reliance in nuclear fuel the aims can hardly be economic. Sweden, which has ten nuclear power reactors, finds it more economic to import low enriched uranium than to do the enrichment itself. 

The crux of the matter is not Iranian intentions – which could change – but the reality that attainment of enrichment capability would shorten the lead time to possible nuclear weapons by perhaps a couple of years. 

For those who wish to reduce rather than increase tensions in the Middle East the relevant question is, therefore, how to induce Iran to stay away from enrichment at least for some time. 

The question is how to do this? 

There has been too much talk of sticks and too little demonstration of carrots.  Again and again Iran has been told that ‘all options are on the table’, which means in plain language that Iran could be the subject of foreign subversion or armed attacks. 

There are now preparations to send the matter to the Security Council, ostensibly to ‘send a clear message’ to Iran that it should refrain from enriching uranium.  As if that message had not been made sufficiently clear…. 

Are there any similarities to the Iraq affair? 

In that case the Security Council was asked to authorize intervention on the basis of an alleged – but unproven – existence of weapons of mass destruction and the violation of UN resolutions. 

Will the Council now be asked to support pressures on Iran because of intentions, which the country is alleged to have?  

If agreement cannot be attained in the Council, will there be a coalition of the willing or some state that is ready to ignore the Council and send cruise missiles on those nuclear energy related facilities, which are known. 

Those not known would, of course, remain and could be completed and put into operation.

In spite of all current speculations about military measures it is hard to believe that governments in Europe and the US would be ready after Iraq to embark on a new, armed adventure. 

If an intensified waving of sticks might perhaps only lead to greater public support in Iran for a government, which otherwise may be losing ground, why not try more carrots?  

Iran cannot be unaware that North Korea is offered many carrots to dismantle its nuclear sector: commitments that the country will not be attacked, an end to the isolation of the country and the opening of diplomatic relations both with the US and Japan plus, of course, economic favours. 

When the US has brought itself both to talk directly with and offer favours to one of the states it branded as a member of the ‘axis of evil’, why not do the same to another of the members? 

Perhaps the US could sit down together with the UK, France and Germany, representing the EU, and Russia and China in direct talks with Iran? 

They should try to induce the country voluntarily to refrain from enriching uranium and to contribute to longer term common efforts to create a zone free from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. 

Israel ought to contribute to such efforts by voluntarily refraining from any further production of plutonium. 

Iran, like Israel and all other states in the Middle East, needs to feel secure. 

The outlook for agreement might be better if Iran were to be told that although the Western states hope for a more democratic and tolerant regime in Iran, such development is viewed as a matter for the Iranians themselves to achieve. 

In return for agreement on no enrichment the country should be promised not be the subject of armed attacks or attempted regime change. 

As in the case of North Korea the US could make normalization of relations part of a deal but Iran could also be required to refrain from supporting terrorist organizations in other countries. 

To induce Iran to refrain from the enrichment of uranium more needs to be put on the table, especially in the field of security.

         HansBlix@MaximsNews.com 

Dr. Hans Blix was born in 1928 in Uppsala, Sweden. He studied at the University of Uppsala; at Columbia University, where he was also a research graduate; and at Cambridge University, where he received his Ph.D.

In 1959, he became Doctor of Laws at the Stockholm University, and in 1960, was appointed Associate Professor in International Law.

He has an Honorary Doctorate from Moscow State University (1987) and is a recipient of the Henry de Wolf Smyth Award (Washington, DC, 1988).

From 1963 to 1976, Dr. Blix was Head of Department at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and served as Legal Adviser on International Law.  In 1976, he became Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, in charge of international development cooperation.  He was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in October 1978.

From 1961 until 1981, he was a member of Sweden's delegation to the United Nations General Assembly; and from 1962 to 1978, a member of the Swedish delegation to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

He served as Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency from 1981 to 1997.

He has written several books on subjects associated with international and constitutional law and was a leader of the Liberal Campaign Committee in favour of retention of the Swedish nuclear energy programme in the referendum in 1980.

Dr. Blix was appointed to by the UN Secretary-General in January 2000 and took up his duties on 1 March 2000.  He is now the former Executive Chairman of United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) .

Currently Hans Blix is the Chairman, Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission and Director-General Emeritus of the IAEA.

Publisher's Note: To read excerpts and to purchase Dr. Blix’s book, see Disarming Iraq.