It is only in the last few years that large parts of such a programme have come to light and resulted in a tense controversy about the aim and continuation of the programme. 

Both the US and Iran seem to step on the gas to show how little they worry about a head- on collision.     

In March of this year the Security Council of the UN urged Iran to comply with a request of the Board of the IAEA inter alia to suspend the programme for enrichment. 

Instead, Iran responded by limiting IAEA inspections to what was legally required and to disallow the more intrusive inspections that had been accepted on a voluntary basis.

Later, Iran declared that it had “joined the nuclear club”. 

This did not mean, it turned out, that Iran had produced 25 kilogrammes of highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon, but rather that a limited number of centrifuges had successfully been connected to a “cascade” yielding some gram quantity of low enriched uranium, which is what nuclear power plants use (by the tons) for fuel.  

Mohamed ElBaradei – my successor as head of the IAEA – has now reported that Iran has failed to comply with the requests of the IAEA and the Security Council. 

Although all nuclear material declared by Iran has been accounted for, the Agency cannot provide assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.

It seems probable that the US, the UK, and France will now propose that the Security Council should order Iran to suspend the program for the enrichment of uranium. 

Different from the Board of the IAEA the Council has the authority under chapter 7 of the Charter to decide on measures – including economic and military sanctions – that become binding on members. 

However, that authority exists only if the Council determines that there exists a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or an act of aggression.  

The US asserts that the purpose of Iran’s enrichment programme is to make nuclear weapons that will threaten other states (especially Israel). 

Many observers think this might be true, but question whether the production of a gram of low enriched uranium, possibly leading to the development of a nuclear weapon in 5 to 10 years, can today be characterized as a “threat to the peace” giving the Council authority even to impose economic and military sanctions?  

Iran will insist that it only seeks to assure the supply of fuel for its nuclear power plants and has a right to do so.  Remember what happened to gas deliveries to the Ukraine? 

However, the skeptic will note that Iran’s indigenous uranium resources are insufficient to make the country independent of imports for its planned nuclear power programme. Iran will not attain self-reliance in nuclear fuel. 

Russia, China and many other states will probably stress that there is ample time for talks and diplomacy and that today’s situation cannot be said to constitute “a threat to the peace”. The US and other states may nevertheless table a resolution to this effect. 

If it were not to be adopted the US could declare that the UN – just as before the Iraq war – has missed its opportunity to act and that the US considers itself free – as Condoleezza Rice said recently – to act “in self defense” against Iran. 

In other words: the US is threatened by Iran.  

A more likely scenario is that the Council adopts a resolution that criticizes Iran and urges member states to try individually or together to induce Iran to stop enriching uranium. 

The US and an “alliance of willing states” could thereafter agree on economic and other means of pressure on Iran. 

Many states, including Russia and China, would not join such measures. 

For its part, Iran might escalate the conflict by withdrawing or threatening to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and stop all inspections by the IAEA. 

There is no promising scenario! Is there any alternative?  

Perhaps it would be time to ask why groups in Iran may want to develop nuclear weapons or at least get closer to the option – and seek to eliminate their rationales? 

The enrichment programme began in the 80s, when Iran was concerned – for good reasons, as it turned out – about an Iraqi nuclear weapon program. 

Today the concern is rather that the US that has military forces and bases near Iran and discusses the bombing of Iran – even the use of nuclear weapons.  

Together with the UK, France and Germany, but also with Russia and China, the US should now sit down somewhere and talk directly with Iran. 

Not only security but also prestige is involved. 

Bullying and bashing will be contra-productive to induce Iran to stop enriching uranium. 

The chances of success might be greater if Iran were offered not only an assurance of supply of uranium fuel for power reactors and freer economic relations but also guarantees against armed attacks from the outside.  

If Iran would guarantee to refrain from supporting terror groups abroad, it should reciprocally be guaranteed that other countries would not assist subversion inside Iran.

Further: if Israel and other countries in the Middle East could be persuaded, like Iran, to refrain from any future enrichment of uranium and production of plutonium, the whole region would take a step toward a more peaceful order and the risk of further proliferation of nuclear weapons -- as well as Israeli nuclear weapons -- would be reduced.    
         HansBlix@MaximsNews.com

Other MaximsNews Columns by Hans Blix

IRAN at the UN SECURITY COUNCIL

The Next Secretary-General of the United Nations

Iran Nuclear Threat?

Iraq: Did They Lie?

The UN and Arms Control

Weapons of Mass Destruction, Challenges Ahead...

Weapons of Mass Destruction, Terrorism, Global Security

Nuclear Weapons and Terrorists

About Hans Blix

Dr Blix is the former Foreign Minister of Sweden and most recently the head of the UN’s weapons inspection team in Iraq.

Before that, from 1981 to 1997, he was the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency in which capacity he oversaw the dismantling of Iraq’s nuclear weapons program. 

He was a delegate to the UN General Assembly for 20 years and to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva for 16 and Chairman, Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission .

He is the Former Executive Chairman of United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and Director-General Emeritus of the IAEA.

Dr. Hans Blix is a Columnist for MaximsNews Network.

To read excerpts and to purchase Dr. Blix’s book, see Disarming Iraq.